

extensions in the Arab states and its "left", represented in the progressive elements and forces which exist within the mainstream of Nasserism.³⁹ The Executive Committee demanded that the "Nasserite Left" should ascertain its ideological, political and organizational "independence" so as to avoid the encroachment of the "right".⁴⁰ To implement this new strategy the national leadership called upon the Arab Nationalists to withdraw from the Arab Socialist Union in Iraq and Syria, so as to lead the "Nasserite Left".⁴¹ Surprisingly, the ANM believed that they could by-pass Nasser's bureaucratic machinery without affecting their good relations with Nasser. However, subsequent events proved how wrong they were. Indeed as the year 1967 approached, their relations with Nasser reached a very low ebb.

Phase V (1967 and after) -- The setback of the June War engendered changes of enormous proportions in the Arab World. It was not unnatural, therefore, that it would constitute a turning point in the life of the movement whose raison d'être was the Palestinian question in the first place.

It is to be recalled that the ANM has followed the lead of Nasser from 1955 onward on the assumption that his revolution is destined to unite the Arabs and liberate their usurped lands. The ANM, in other words, has travelled Nasser's

³⁹ Muhsin Ibrahim (ed.), Limatha munathammat al-Ishtirakiyeen al-Lebnaniyeen, [What For is the Organization of Lebanese Socialists], (Beirut: Dar al-tali'ah, 1970), p. 77.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.