

School for Sciences), *Jam'iat al-Shabiba al-Yafiyya* (The Jaffa Youth Society), *Jam'iat al-Ta'awun al-Massihi* (The Social Christian Welfare Association), and *Al-Jam'ia al-Ahliyya* (The National Society) which was similar to the local Zionist Organisation, composed of Jaffa's leading Muslim and Christian families and was responsible for dealing with the Government.

Other efforts were directed at thwarting Zionist efforts by practical means. During June a member of the British political staff in Palestine reported that in Jerusalem

... a society was being formed by Christians and Moslems with a program to combat Jewish predominance; to counteract Jewish influence and to impede by all possible means, the purchase of land by the Jews.⁴⁶

Another important literary-political association *al-Nadi al'Arabi* (The 'Arab Club) was reactivated in Jerusalem during June 1918 by Haj Amin al-Husseini (brother of the Mufti Kamel al-Husseini) and other young Jerusalemites ostensibly dedicated to the revival of the Arabic language and literature.⁴⁷

During August 1918, it was reported that *al-Jam'ia al-Islamiyya* (The Islamic Society) founded some years earlier in Jerusalem 'with a view to preserving Muslim property from being acquired or exploited by Christians or Jews', was reactivated.⁴⁸ Another society *al-Ikha'wa al-'Afaf* (Brotherhood and Chastity) closely connected with guarding Muslim property was reported as being active on a later date.⁴⁹

In one of his more perceptive reports on the political situation, Clayton provided an account of the economic factors at play within the ranks of Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism:

Class Attitudes

The great majority of the more or less educated Arabs regard any prospect of Zionist extension with fear and dislike. The small land-owner with his shiftless and antiquated methods of cultivation realises that he cannot hold his own against Jewish science and energy; the trader foresees the day when Jewish enterprise, backed by Jewish money and employing modern business methods will inevitably squeeze him off the market; the small Effendi, whose one ambition has always been to secure a Government appointment, sees an administration in which the better educated, and more intelligent Jew, will predominate, thereby lessening the chances for him and for his class of obtaining the coveted official post. . . the

classes to which I have alluded above will spare no effort to induce in the peasantry a hostile attitude towards the Jews. They are in closer touch with the lower strata of society than any other class, and it is not difficult for them to persuade an ignorant and gullible population that Zionism is only another word for robbing them of their lands and even of their means of livelihood.⁵⁰

Clayton apparently neglected to add the city and town workers (porters, dock-workers, labourers engaged in traditional industries, etc.). According to Ormsby-Gore, 'The main problem is the competition between Jewish and Arab labour'.⁵¹

It should be pointed out that some of the classes referred to in Clayton's report had, in spite of their opposition to Zionism, a vested interest in befriending the prevailing government on which their economic well-being and ambitions depended. Thus, in spite of a clear convergence of British policy and Zionism in Palestine, no public manifestations of Palestinian Arab antipathy to British military occupation on a mass scale were discernible and recruiting for Faisal's army was still going on.⁵² Some Palestinian notables were trying through personal contacts and diplomacy to dissuade British officials on the spot from supporting Zionism.

In August 1918, Ormsby-Gore reported that 'The Moslem-Effendi class which has no real political cohesion and above all no power of organisation is either pro-Turk or pro-British' and in any case they 'will not dare to do anything to embarrass a British military administration backed with British bayonets'.⁵³

This did not mean that the Palestinian Arabs were not constantly protesting and complaining against the British pro-Zionist policy:

The Christians complain of favouritism shown by the authorities to the Jew. The Moslems complain among other things that the Sharif has no representative and played no part in the entry into Jerusalem and that recruiting for Faisal's Army has only just been allowed as we have only conceded it because we had to send the majority of our troops to France. . . It is incontestable that the policy has greatly added to our difficulties.⁵⁴

The considerations that Ormsby-Gore referred to were real and as long as the War was going on, the political notables and their Muslim-Christian Societies were unable to articulate Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism in any effective manner. On 4 August Clayton reported