

of Palestine. The policy of non-co-operation was discussed and the *Istiqlalists* suggested social and political boycott of Government, the non-payment of direct taxes such as tithes, *werko* (a rural tax), urban property tax and the boycott of British and Jewish goods as well. However,

Party conflict between the pro and anti-Mufti factions reigned. . . It was clear that the anti-Mufti faction was mainly concerned in placing Haj Amin in a critical position in insisting on his resignation.⁵⁴

from the Muslim Supreme Council as a first act in the policy of non-cooperation. The Husseini-Nashahibi antagonism was not the only snag to the adoption of the policy of non-co-operation. The propertied participants were apprehensive of the consequence of non-payment of taxes. The assembly adopted the principle of non-co-operation and restricted its application to the boycott of Government receptions and Boards on the political-social level and the boycott of British and Zionist goods on the economic level. On the more crucial aspects of the non-co-operation policy, namely, the non-payment of taxes, the wiser counsels of the propertied classes prevailed.⁵⁵ The issue was referred to a committee of the members of the Arab Executive including a member representing each of the parties in the country, to study the various implications, and methods that would lead to the execution of the idea of non-co-operation. A similar decision taken ten years earlier led to the suppression of the idea altogether. The assembly was dominated by pro-Mufti elements. Ragheb Nashashibi did not attend and his supporters withdrew before the meeting came to an end, and the watering down of the policy on non-co-operation reflected Hajj Amin's friendly relations with the High Commissioner, as well as the vested interests of some of his political associates.

The lukewarm attitude of the leadership notwithstanding, the general Palestinian mood was becoming increasingly militant. When the Colonial Secretary toured Palestine in April 1933, the Arab Executive called for his boycott and alleged that he had come to 'strengthen the pillars of British and Zionist colonization'⁵⁶ and to pave the way for evicting Arabs to bring more Jews into the country.⁵⁷

The proposed committee on non-co-operation did not materialise and the High Commissioner reported that the leaders were afraid of legal liabilities, that the pro-Nashashibi Party were definitely not disposed to participate in the proposed Committee, and that even the

Istiqlalists were not enthusiastic.⁵⁸ The eviction of the Arabs of Wadi Hawareth by the Jews, with the aid of Government forces, was the subject of Arab agitation against Jewish immigration and Government policy throughout the summer of 1933. On 10 August, the CID reported that political leaders were 'interesting themselves in finding a means to redeem lands' and that delegations were visiting villagers in Wadi Kabbani to warn against sale of lands to Jews.

The Pressure of Jewish Immigration

The flow of legal and illegal Zionist immigration assumed alarming proportions⁵⁹ and the resolutions of the Zionist Congress in Prague, which dwelt on opening the gates of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration in view of the Nazi persecution, added oil to the Palestinian's fire.⁶⁰ Even the lethargic Arab Executive were induced to take a more radical stand and decided during a meeting in early September to stage a general demonstration in Jerusalem on 13 September without applying for Government permission. Other towns were to observe a strike on the same day:

At first the Government endeavoured to talk the leaders out of this challenge to its authority,⁶¹ but later requested that the demonstration should not transcend the limits of the Old City. The well advertised demonstration was led by leaders from all political groups which inspired an unprecedented feeling of national unity and determination. Eventually, the demonstrators clashed with the police, and the authorities took legal action against a number of Arab leaders. Following the demonstration the members of the Arab Executive met at Musa Mazem's house and resolved to stage another demonstration in Jaffa four weeks later. In a memorandum to the High Commissioner, dated 30 September 1933, a number of Arab Nationalists from Nablus accused the Government of Palestine of working for the destruction of the Palestinian Arabs and their replacement by Jews and threatened to adopt self-defensive measures against the flood of Jewish immigrants.

On 8 October, the Arab Executive decided to hold another demonstration on 13 October in Jerusalem, in defiance of the orders of the High Commissioner. Before the Friday prayers were over, the shops were closed and scores of Christians and about 50 women were waiting outside the *Haram* to join the demonstration at its starting point. The demonstration of several thousand strong revealed the depth of hostility towards the Police; and baton charges by the latter against the demonstrators reinforced that feeling. Five members of the Police and six members of the public were injured.