

goodwill messages on that occasion were lukewarm. They could not help feeling that Qassam's revolt was an indictment of their futile methods and that his selflessness contrasted with their selfish motives and pursuits.

Subsequently, however, the Palestinian leaders felt compelled to adopt a less conciliatory policy towards the British. In an interview with Wauchope six days after Qassam's death, representatives of the five Arab parties submitted a memorandum and told the High Commissioner that

Unless they received a reply to their memorandum which could be generally regarded as giving satisfaction to their requests, they would lose all influence with their followers; extreme and irresponsible counsels would prevail and the political situation would rapidly deteriorate.<sup>102</sup>

In his covering letter Wauchope informed J.H. Thomas, the new Colonial Secretary, that the Arab leaders were

right in saying that otherwise they will lose such influence as they possess and that the possibility of alleviating the present situation by means of moderate measures suggested by me will disappear.<sup>103</sup>

Qassam's revolt cast a long shadow on the Palestinian political scene, and any attempt to effect a detente in the situation was doomed to failure. Less than a month after the troops' encounter with Qassam, the CID was expressing its concern at the turn of events. Hostility against the Government, they reported, had spread to the villages of Palestine. Qassam and his followers were held in high esteem as heroes and martyrs. There were popular discussions over the fact that the Egyptian nationalists had obtained concessions from the British only after they resorted to more violent means than hitherto. A more serious development was the emergence of radical youth groups under revolutionary leadership to replace the discredited older political leadership.

The new formations popped up in the major towns and were led or inspired by the young radical with whose name the group was associated. Akram Zu'ayter was associated with the Nablus group and Hamdi Husseini led the Jaffa radicals in collaboration with Michel Mitri, leader of the Arab Labour Society of Jaffa. At Qalqilya a new Revolutionary Youth Committee was formed; in Tulkarem, Salim 'Abdul Rahman and the Arab Scout leaders led another youth group;

and at Haifa 'Aref Nuralla led a similar movement. These groups were supported by Darwaza and 'Ajaj Nweihed, both of them founding members of the *Istiqlal* Party. Hamdi Husseini and 'Akram Zu'ayter contributed regular articles to Jamal Husseini's newspaper *al-Liwa* (The Standard).

According to CID reports these combined groups intended:

(a) To direct political agitation against the British authorities, and not against Zionism. This is clear from their writings and speeches.

(b) To force the Party leaders to adopt some firm decision at the Nablus meeting on the 15th January, such as non-cooperation, non-payment of taxes, demonstrations, etc.

(c) To stimulate agitation and public feeling until the meeting on the 15th January.

(d) Subsequently to create disorders.<sup>104</sup>

The shape of things to come had already been determined, and the showdown between the British and the Palestinian Arabs became only a matter of time.

#### Notes

1. Chancellor to Passfield, 17 January 1930, CO 733/182, p.2.
2. Chancellor to Passfield, 22 February 1930, CO 733/190.
3. Toynbee, *Arnold Survey of International Affairs, 1930*. London, 1931, p.282.
4. Chancellor to Passfield, 22 February 1930, op.cit., p.8.
5. *Ibid.*, p.9.
6. Shaw Commission Report, op.cit., p.113.
7. In the years 1921-1925 the Jews acquired 236,000 *dunums* almost exclusively from individual absentee landlords: Between 1921 and 1930 the Jews gradually acquired undivided shares in the village lands, which they sought to partition and dispossess the villagers of the lands. *Ibid.*, pp.51-2.
8. *Ibid.*, p.129.
9. *Ibid.*, p.98.
10. For a report submitted by the Delegation on the London negotiation to the Executive Committee on 27 July 1930, see Documents, op.cit., pp.181-8.
11. See Chancellor to Passfield, 17 April 1930, Enclosure, CO 733/185.
12. According to a report by Hyamson, Chief Immigration Officer, the number of unemployed was in excess of 12,000 in December 1930, see Chancellor to Passfield, 18 July 1931, Enclosure A, CO 733/202.
13. See Departmental Note by Shuckburgh, 18 June 1930, June 733/185.
14. *Ibid.*
15. 'Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development by Sir John Hope-Simpson', Cmd. 3686, 1930.
16. 'Palestine: Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom', Cmd. 3692, 1930.
17. These estimates were quoted in the Peel Commission Report, op.cit., p.71.