

78. See Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 5 February 1934, CO 733/254.
79. Cabinet. Palestine, 28 March 1934, CO 733/258, p.2.
80. See Darwaza, *op.cit.*, pp.109-10.
81. Interview with Emile Ghoury, Beirut, August, 1967.
82. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 5 January 1934, CO 733/258, pp.3-4.
83. The Government resented this unsolicited help from Arab volunteers to apply the law against illegal Jewish immigration and subsequently prohibited the formation of these patrols.
84. OAG to Cunliffe-Lister, 12 September 1934, CO 733/257.
85. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 25 August 1934, Enclosure A, CO 733/265.
86. Hajj Amin insisted on the representatives being directly elected by the people while Ragheb Nashashibi preferred an appointed Legislative Council owing to his weak position with the electorate.
87. Cabinet. 'Palestine Legislative Council', 14 November 1934, CO 733/265. The Prime Minister was of the opinion that the Zionist demand for 'parity' with the Arabs in the Legislative Council 'was a good thing'. Also see Departmental note by Downie, 'Palestine Legislative Council', 4 October 1934, CO 733/265.
88. Mogannam, *op.cit.*, p.237.
89. See Documents, *op.cit.*, pp.359-68.
90. see Sifri, *op.cit.*, pp.196-201.
91. See *Falastin*, 3 July 1935.
92. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 6 March 1935, CO 733/272.
93. For a report on the Conference of the 'Ulama, see Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 4 March 1935, CO 733/278.
94. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, April 1935, CO 733/278.
95. Ghoury related the gist of a conversation between 'Abdul Qader and a few young revolutionaries with Hajj Amin in 1934 to the effect that the Mufti thought their enthusiasm to fight the British face-to-face was premature.
96. For the Constitution of the Association, see Documents, pp.97-101. Not to be confused with the Egyptian association bearing the same name.
97. Some of Qassam's followers reported that the revolutionaries of the early thirties were impatient members of Qassam's secret organisations who opposed their leader's call for further preparations before declaring the Revolution. See Subhi Yasin, *Harb al Isabat fi-Falastin* (Guerrilla Warfare in Palestine), Cairo, 1967, pp.68-70.
98. See Naji Allush, *Al-Muqawama al-'Arabiyya fi Falastin, 1917-1948* (The Arab Resistance in Palestine), Beirut, 1967, p.102. The Italians were much assailed in Palestine for their oppression of the Muslim Arab population of Libya, in addition to a violent anti-Italian campaign waged by *Falastin* in the wake of the Ethiopian invasion.
99. Subhi Yasin, *al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra fi Falastin, 1936-1939*. (The Great Arab Revolt in Palestine), Damascus, 1959, p.23.
100. 7 December 1935, CO 733/294.
101. *Ibid.*
102. Wauchope to J.H. Thomas, 7 December 1935, CO 733/294.
103. *Ibid.*
104. See Rice to Chief Secretary, 14 December 1935, CO 733/297.

7 THE GREAT PALESTINE REVOLT: 1936-1939

The gathering clouds of autumn 1935, presaged the impending storm of 1936. The number of landless Arab peasants and the number of unemployed Arabs in the big cities was on the increase. The Arabs were becoming increasingly convinced that if no restrictions on Jewish immigration were imposed they would soon become a minority in their own country, and that if no limitations were imposed on land sales, the Arab peasants would be uprooted and evicted from their homeland. The economic crisis of 1935 further aggravated the situation. Qassam's revolt, though abortive, pointed out the only way left to the Palestinians to resist a Zionist take-over of their country, and many of Qassam's associates and disciples were still at large ready to take up arms against the JNH and the British at the earliest opportunity. Rising tides of nationalist struggle in Egypt and Syria against foreign rule encouraged radical Muslim and Arab nationalist elements to adopt similar methods to attain the same ends in Palestine. The Mediterranean crisis precipitated by Italy's Ethiopian campaign gave rise to hopes that a European War, which was believed to be imminent, would provide an opportunity for the Arabs to realise their long-sought political and national aims. The smuggling of arms on a relatively large scale by the Jews attracted attention to the prospect of armed conflict between the Arabs on the one hand and the Jews and the British on the other.

Alive to the dangerous state of Arab opinion in Palestine the High Commissioner was authorised, one month after Qassam's revolt, to make an announcement regarding the setting up of a legislative council, which was followed shortly by a proposal in connection with the limitation of land sales. The Jewish leaders categorically rejected the scheme while emphasising 'their desire and determination to maintain co-operation with Government in all matters save only that of the Legislative Council'.¹

The proposals were critically received by the Arabs, but even Jamal Husseini, who was very critical of the scheme, thought it well to give Wauchope a private assurance 'that nothing that he said should be regarded as rejection of the proposals'.² Arab objections to the composition and powers of the Legislative Council notwithstanding, the scheme itself and the Land Transfer Legislation proposals had a