

National Charter and PNC decisions.

3. The merger of the guerrilla organizations adopting the same ideology and political thought is a national necessity. Until this is achieved, each organization reserves the right to preserve its organizational structure on condition that all its other institutions are dissolved and merged into the PLO's institutions.

The PLO legislative bodies and higher executive take into consideration the principle of democratic centralism, collective leadership and minority adherence to the decisions of the majority. Every organization reserves the right to raise its views again for discussion through the legislative and executive bodies on condition that they meanwhile remain committed to the decisions already taken in the PNC. Cadres have the right to practice constructive criticism concerning all decisions of the legislative and executive bodies.

National work in the Jordanian arena is governed by the program of the National Front.

4. The PNC draws up a strategy for the current stage as well as political, military, financial and informational strategies which all are obliged to abide by.

5. An active leadership is formed to take the responsibility for leading the Palestinian struggle on all levels.

6. A basic condition for unity is abiding by the decisions of the leadership which is responsible for carrying out its own decisions and those of the PNC. The leadership is also responsible for dealing with cases of violation of decisions within limits that correspond to the higher interests of the revolution.

Following this session, the unity of the military forces was emphasized.

At the 10th session, proposals were passed concerning the committee of national unity. The 11th session drew up the practical steps for implementing what had been agreed upon. The 12th and 13th sessions dealt with important and dangerous political issues, the question of a settlement, especially since the Palestinian right had begun to retreat from a firm national position after the 1973 war. The right-wing policy began to have an impact on the decisions and programs of the PNC, but the 14th session reinstated a clear-cut political and organizational position, better and more mature than the previous one. The PFLP, along with the other democratic and nationalist forces, played a basic role in the formulation of the final decisions and curbing right-wing influence in the leadership.

Evaluation

However, three things become clear after the passage of 10 years (1971 to 1981, the 8th-15th PNC sessions) with respect to Palestinian national relations.

One: There was an unrealistic evaluation of the organizational situation. There was an attempt to jump from a situation where there were no particular bylaws for internal relations, to one speaking of democratic centralism and merging the organizations with the same ideological line and then uniting all.

Two: There was a departure from all the decisions in this field. In place of these decisions, the factional domination of Fatah was imposed. Calls for united front relations were replaced by neglecting to look for the causes of the problem and its solution. There was moreover failure to follow up the execution of decisions.

Three: There was confusion between structure and principles and concrete measures. Analysis also reveals a distinct

duality: At a time when the charter stipulated election of the Executive Committee as leader of the Palestinian people's struggle, the PNC adopted the fifth clause of the organizational program at the 14th session, stating: «A leadership is formed which will shoulder the responsibility of Palestinian struggle.»

What are the reasons for this?

First is the political and class nature of the prevailing PLO leadership, which is governed by bourgeois understanding of national relations and the mentality of special tenure (the political counterpart of private ownership in the economic sphere). Such a leadership strives to weaken its partners during the national struggle in order to expand its own influence; it practices methods of domination and individualism, neglecting all principles of collective leadership.

The second reason is that the establishment of the PLO and all the resistance organizations was governed in one way or another by the conditions that have prevailed on the Arab level since the sixties. This had its effect on the social structure of the Palestinian society in exile.

The third reason is the predominance of factionalism and narrow interests at the expense of front work and national interests. This overshadowed the institutions of collective work.

Fourth was the absence of the fundamentals of front work and of any plan for national unity and relations. There was no process for implementing decisions, not to mention cases of outright refusal to implement them.

Despite the importance of these reasons, they did not impede the continuation of the struggle for national unity and correct relations within the organization. Much more dangerous was that the leadership, motivated by its class nature, was laying the foundation for bringing about a major political step which would release it from all commitment to the national program. This would leave it free to deviate and capitulate while retaining the PLO in form but not content, to be steered by the policies of Arab reaction. These intentions became clear after the 1982 war. It became clear that the right-wing intended to subjugate the PLO to Arab reaction's capitulationist plans, despite all the political and struggle gains that had been made on the Arab and international level. Although the PFLP made all positive efforts to develop the policies of the PLO, revolutionize its institutions and organize its work, we find that all the sessions of the PNC, especially after 1971, foretold the consequences of the individualistic leadership.

The PFLP also demonstrated a high level of responsibility in its strivings to unite the revolutionary democratic forces, as stipulated in the political report of the 4th congress. In this, the PFLP was motivated by awareness of the importance of strengthening the position of the left, so it could play a more influential role capable of enforcing a sound, militant national program and firm front relations. We are well aware that the factors of the current political crisis in the PLO, and the extent of the differences, only makes the going harder. However, the PFLP still regards the solution to confronting the revolution's difficulties to be strengthening and unifying the role of the revolutionary democratic forces, and rallying all the democratic and nationalist forces to confront the dangers facing the PLO, the revolution and cause. This is actually what the PFLP is doing in its capacity as an organization which enjoys the confidence of the masses. Mass support enables us to popularize the rejection of deviation, and continue to struggle against the imperialist-Zionist enemy, emphasizing a unanimous national program for return to the homeland, self-determination and an independent Palestinian state.