

PLO leadership encouraged the two enemies. What are their plans?

### King Hussein's speech

The content of King Hussein's speech clearly reflects his intention to swallow the PLO...If there is one thing we have in common with King Hussein, it is the necessity of studying this speech very closely. Hussein gave a historical resume of how his regime has viewed the Palestinian cause, emphasizing the period after 1967. Time does not allow me to cover this speech in detail, and I do not wish to keep you for three and a half hours as he did. However, I do want to stress the main ideas.

Clearly, Hussein wishes to separate the subject of the land from that of the Palestinian people's national rights...He emphasized UN resolutions 242 and 338 as *the basis* of a just, comprehensive and enduring solution for the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, he completely neglected UN resolutions like 3336 which stress not only the land, but the Palestinians' right to return, self-determination and an independent national state! It is as if he is saying it is important to save the land, but the martyrs of the Palestinian revolution, the Palestinian people, the whole Palestinian cause are something else.

Another idea along the same lines is his reference to this period as one when the «consequences of aggression» must be wiped out, i.e., to return the West Bank to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and then later deal with the other issues.

With respect to the decisions of the Rabat Summit of 1974, which acknowledge the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people...Hussein intimated that they have now become an obstacle to the process of recovering the land. He goes further and tries to divide into two the Palestinian people who are united under the banner of the PLO. According to him, there are the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians who are concerned with saving the land. Then there are those Palestinians outside who don't really care about saving the land, but are more concerned with slogans and outbidding others.

Some may say: «He has a point there; there is a foul settlement plan, and frankly we want to save the land!» Well and good, but how does Hussein propose to save the land?

There is a law derived from many revolutionary experiences: What is taken by force can only be regained by force. Our people's experience with the Zionist enemy, the course of the Zionist movement and the policies of the various Zionist parties prove that it is impossible to expect 'Israel' to withdraw from all the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Only if 'Israel' finds itself under a barrage of fire mortally threatening it, might it begin to *consider* withdrawal...Is that what the king has mentioned as a method for saving the land?...No! He advocates diplomatic maneuvers...Maybe the US would finally condescend to pacify Hussein with a piece of land?!

In short, Hussein's speech contains the following ideas: (1)First we concern ourselves with the land and afterwards we think about the people. (2)We restore the land through diplomatic methods because of Arab weakness and hesitancy.

In the summer of 1971, we fought our last battle with the regime on Jordanian soil. After that King Hussein proposed his project for a 'United Arab Kingdom'. The memoirs of prominent US and Zionist politicians reveal that, during the decisive battles with the fedayeen, Hussein was promised the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Why wasn't he able to get the land back? Hasn't he read the Likud's program? He makes a big show of being scientific

and objective. We have the duty to expose his aims and deceitful intentions to our masses. Let him read the Zionist programs and then tell us if we can ever regain the land without force of arms!

### Hussein aims to swallow the PLO

In his speech, Hussein also stressed his adherence to the Amman accord. He declared a halt to coordination with the rightist leadership, but the accord still holds. King Hussein realizes the extent to which the present PLO leadership is willing to stoop to enter the US gateway. He also wishes to preserve the concessions already extracted. He wishes for this leadership to go on making concessions until it liquidates itself on its own.

Finally, I wish to point out that Hussein has now taken a position different from the one he took after the Rabat decisions. Houari Boumedien (the late Algerian president) personally told me the story of how these decisions were made. They were adopted unanimously. During the sessions, Hussein opposed them. However, finding himself without sufficient backing and due to the resounding voice of the PLO at that time, Hussein grudgingly consented to their adoption. He said to the PLO: «You try (and see if you can solve the Palestinian cause your way).»

In his speech, however, the king was definitely against the Rabat decisions. This time he did not say: «The PLO and I did not agree on resolutions 242 and 338, and I therefore leave the matter up to the PLO.» This time, Hussein says: «I'm directly concerned and my duties with regard to the East and West Bank and Jerusalem oblige me to go ahead to save the land.»

This leads me to the political aim behind his speech.

Is the aim to pressure the PLO to make more concessions and agree to resolutions 242 and 338?

Is it to protect his throne in the East Bank (Jordan), especially in the light of the continuous Israeli threats?

Is it to decrease the difficulties in obtaining the arms package from the US?

Is it to improve relations with Syria in the belief that the Syrian stand towards the present PLO leadership would be extended to all of the PLO?

The aim is all of the above in one form or another. We in the PFLP believe, however, that the central aim is liquidating the PLO, because it is considered *the* obstacle to the US solutions. Other variations of this liquidation, which would allow for the implementation of the US solutions, include finding a substitute for the PLO, or a Hashemite PLO, or going ahead without the PLO.

The wording of the speech is also indicative of Hussein's intentions. He notes that ever since 1967, he has taken the initiative, or participated in all initiatives, except — he said — the Sadat initiative, although he described it as a «historical and daring» step. The ex-foreign minister of Egypt, Ibrahim Kamel, notes in his memoirs that during the Camp David negotiations, King Hussein was in continuous contact with Sadat. Thus Hussein has not exempted himself from *any* initiative. What he wishes to say is: «I will continue with these initiatives. I want the US to understand this well, so as to protect my throne.»

For years we have led the battle to protect the PLO...Ever since the foundation of the revolution, the enemy camp has tried to liquidate it and the PLO. They imagined that they succeeded in defeating us in Jordan, but we sprang up again in Lebanon. In Lebanon, the enemy tried many times to liquidate