

efforts with Syria to improve relations.

On the popular level, the PLO must strengthen its alliance with the nationalist and progressive forces in the Arab world, because it is they who stand in the same trench with the Palestinian people, confronting imperialism and Zionism.

On the international level, it must be clear that the natural allies of the Palestinian revolution, like for any liberation movement, are the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and the progressive and peace-loving forces all over the world. The right wing in the PLO has tried to equate the imperialist countries of Western Europe with the socialist countries. If the distinction between the two is not made clear in the future program of national unity, this could ease the way for the imposition of the US imperialist schemes via its European allies.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUE

To guarantee honest and sure implementation of the national unity program, the organizational basis for national unity in the PLO must be clearly defined. The organizational issue is as vital as the political questions, for experience has proved that the PLO institutions, if dominated by a bourgeois and rightist majority, can deviate from the national platform, when pressured by the enemy. Thus, the coming dialogue must deal with sensitive, concrete issues such as the composition of the new executive committee, the PNC and all other PLO institutions.

The democratic forces must have at least half the seats in the

PLO institutions for two reasons: First, this is necessary to prevent deviation from the national unity program agreed on, by denying the Palestinian bourgeois the majority it previously held. Second, this would reflect the size and activity of the democratic forces in the Palestinian arena, which is greater than their former representation in the PLO institutions. To give some examples: The Palestinian Communist Party, the Popular Struggle Front and the Palestinian Liberation Front were never represented in the executive committee. The PFLP had only 13 members among the 400 members of the PNC, with Saïqa, the DFLP, and PFLP-General Command each having about the same. The remaining majority of PNC members were appointed by the chairman. The democratic forces did not head any one of the 93 PLO offices around the world.

Thus, an important point of discussion in the national dialogue should be the membership of a coming PNC. Will the members of a new, unifying PNC be those of the illegitimate session in Amman in 1984, or those of the 16th session in Algeria, whose term has expired according to the PLO's internal constitution. Or will it be new members committed to the unity and rectification of the PLO's line, as agreed upon among the Palestinian patriotic organizations?

These are a few examples of what must be discussed in the dialogue, when it is opened after cancellation of the Amman accord. Anything less cannot be in the interest of the Palestinian struggle, or serve the purpose of confronting the enemy plans.

# Operation Naharia

«The road to liberating all of Palestine is not via relations with the capitals of Camp David, but via the barrel of a gun. While 'Israel' considers its borders to be from the Nile to the Euphrates, we stress that our war with 'Israel' is a struggle of existence, not a border dispute.»

These words were recorded by comrade Mohammed Mahmoud Kana'a before he and three others - Abdullah Al Shahabi, Abdul Hadi Qathem and Khalil Khattab carried out a heroic operation against the Zionist entity. In the early hours of July 10th, a joint unit of the PFLP and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) of Lebanon launched an attack on the Zionist settlement, Naharia, in the north of occupied Palestine. The unit bore the name of two martyrs: Ghassan Kanafani, a founder and Politbureau member of the PFLP, who was martyred when Zionist agents boobytrapped his car in Beirut on July 8, 1972; and Mohammed Salim, cadre of the SSNP and leader of the Lebanese National Resistance Front, who was murdered by Zionist agents last year.

The revolutionary unit went into action at midnight, departing in a dinghy with a highpowered motor. Their weapons were Klashnikov and BKC machine guns, hand grenades and an RPG. They reached Naharia at about 3 a.m. and landed near a Zionist military camp where they engaged the border patrol in battle. The freedom fighters were able to gain control of one of the buildings. Wireless communica-

tion with the commandos at 9 a.m. revealed that two of them had been martyred, and the Zionists had suffered many losses. The Zionists were applying full force, using their navy, ground troops and helicopters. There was no communication with the unit after that. Later it was known that all four of the freedom fighters were martyred in the battle.

This operation greatly disturbed the Zionists, and announcements about it were contradictory. First, 'Israel' said that the commandos were intercepted in the sea north of the border. Then they said that a battle took place in the sea north of Palestine. The Zionist entity admitted the death of two of their soldiers and the injury of nine, two of them seriously. Their casualties were certainly much higher, so one can imagine that a certain number of these will be reported as victims of road accidents!

The PFLP issued a political statement describing the operation as part of «escalating armed struggle until liberating South Lebanon and occupied Palestine. This operation embodied the militant solidarity between the Lebanese and Palestinian masses...The success of our revolutionary heroes in rea-

ching Palestine is clear evidence of the position of our Palestinian masses and their nationalist and democratic forces, who oppose the capitulationist policies of the dominant rightist leadership of the PLO. This operation is an answer to the reactionary Jordanian regime's attempts to create alternatives to the PLO - with the support of imperialism and Zionism. It shows the inability of the Zionist enemy to prevent Palestinian militants from reaching Palestine. It is a new proof of the failure of the aims of 'Operation Peace for the Galilee' - the 1982 Zionist invasion of Lebanon.»

## DOUBLE AGGRESSION

The extent to which this operation disturbed the Zionists was shown by the fact that they felt called upon to launch a double aggression on Lebanon in the course of four days. At 7 p.m., the day of the operation, four US-made Cobra helicopters bombarded Ain Al Hilweh refugee camp on the outskirts of Sidon. The Israeli helicopters unleashed 16 rockets. One person was martyred and seven wounded, among them two children and two women.

On July 14th, the Zionists carried out a second attack. Fighter jets bombed a