

cerned about the cause - far from it. It would have been much better had they turned to the national democratic forces in Egypt directly.

It is the duty of every progressive nationalist Arab to extinguish the fires of secondary conflict in the Arab nationalist ranks. Dictated by a sense of responsibility towards the Arab nation, all should support the unity of the PLO on the basis of the Aden-Algers agreement. No doubt, implementing the Prague Declaration requires much struggle, before the unity of the PLO is realized on the basis of opposition to imperialism - far from any illusions - and allied with Syria and the Lebanese national movement. This alliance would then be a genuine support to the Egyptian national movement.

**What are the implications of the relations between Mubarak's regime and the rightist PLO leadership, for the Egyptian and the Palestinian national struggles?**

When Sadat returned from his visit to Jerusalem in 1977, he was welcomed. It was only the Egyptian Communist Party and the Progressive Unionist Party that opposed the visit. However, before the year was out, all forces in the Egyptian arena were opposed to this visit. The Egyptian people know that Egypt was boycotted because of this visit, because of this clear treason to the Palestinian and Egyptian cause.

If the regimes do not reconsider their relations with the Egyptian regime, this will contribute to strengthening the illusions of the Egyptian people that Mubarak's regime is better than Sadat's. And if the PLO, the party directly concerned with the cause, does not reconsider its relations with the Egyptian regime, this reinforces these illusions.

This poses the question: What's the use of a broad mass resurgence against the regime?

This all contributes to misinforming the masses and strengthens the illusions as to the nature of the regime and the extent of its deterioration.

During the recent period, especially after the revolt of the security forces, there was talk about national reconciliation among national forces which possess a high level of awareness. What, then, do we expect of the ordinary citizen when he witnesses rapprochement between those directly involved in the cause and the Egyptian regime. We remain opposed to any attempts to build bridges with the Egyptian regime.

Some news agencies carried information about a struggle among different factions in the Egyption regime, especially between the former prime minister and the defence minister and the president. According to the news agencies, these struggles were connected to Washington's desire to change the regime, replacing Mubarak with Abu Ghazala, the defence minister, because he is more responsive to Washington's plans. In your opinion, how correct is this information? Does this have a relationship with developments in the region as a whole?

First, it is necessary to clarify a subject that some ignore: Mubarak and Abu Ghazala and Kamal Hassan Ali (the former prime minister) are all sons of Egypt's military institution.

Secondly, the question of struggles between various capitalist forces is an established fact. In the USA, where pure capitalist development has reached its highest stages, there are contradictions and struggles, for example, between the military sector and the civilian industrial sector, between the oil monopolies and agricultural monopolies....etc. Such contradictions are inevitable because any capitalist regime is based on competition. They are however secondary contradictions and will not reach the point of rupturing the regime.

In Egypt also, there are contradictions between various factions of the ruling authority.

Some speak of comprador capitalism. Some prefer to describe it as parasitic, others as bureaucratic, and there are those who speak about a big bourgeoisie connected with foreign capital.

Those some describe as «parasites» are, in fact, capitalists. Some of them accumulated their wealth - at first through illegitimate (i.e. parasitic) activities, stealing, bribery, illegal transactions between the private and public sectors, hashish trade...etc. Let us take Sadat as an example. At first, he accumulated his wealth through illegitimate means. After accumulating this wealth, preserving it necessitated its investment into bigger projects. For example, Sadat owned a tile factory, a petroleum shipping company, poultry farms and farm lands, a company for importing wood...etc. All these are activities which are at the heart of normal capitalist activity. Capitalism which accumulated its wealth through parasitic activities, is big capitalism. Those who accumulated their capital by taking advantage of their positions in the public sector, i.e. bureaucratic bourgeoisie, also began expansion by investing this wealth in their own private projects.

Conflicts emerge among the various bourgeois sectors, on who will be the decision-maker. They are, however, all joined through links to foreign capital, the multinational corporations, and their complete subjugation to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund schemes. In addition, they are organically united among themselves in their exploitation of the toiling masses of worker and peasants.

Thus such contradictions are secondary and cannot be relied upon to reach a stage whereby radical changes can occur, resulting in a nationalist regime. The wagering on such false hopes by differentiating between such things as «evil parasitic capitalists» and «positive capitalist production» must be eliminated. The latter is an expression of the intermarriage between local and foreign capital.

Discussion of the possibility that Abu Ghazala may orchestrate a coup against Mubarak in order to force the latter into granting more concessions, has no support in reality. Let us take the example of the General Motors Corporation deal which Abu Ghazala was involved in and signed for the production of cars in Egypt. This 'gain' for the big bourgeoisie in Egypt was reciprocated with a concession to the U.S. : allowing the passage of U.S. nuclear warships through the Suez Canal. This concession was made by Mubarak not Abu Ghazala. We are confident that Abu Ghazala does not have more to offer than Mubarak.

With respect to a possible military coup, it is known that any coup in order to succeed must offer something to win credibility. What will Abu Ghazala offer? Will he say he is against corruption and Mubarak is a symbol of that corruption? Can he promise to extricate Egypt from its chronic economic crisis? The option of a military coup is improbable; however what may prolong the life of the regime is the liberal facade that allows the opposition «to let off steam» in the newspapers. The lesson of Marcos and Duvalier confirm that Washington easily abandons its agents and dictatorship regimes in order to preserve this facade of liberalism.

In addition to this, the new tune in Egypt today is that of the «danger of Islamic groups». This is the new scarecrow being brandished in the face of the masses in order that they be satisfied with the standing situation of corruption.

Nevertheless, the more important question remains: Is there a force which can generate enough pressure to threaten the regime with being overthrown thus justifying a search for a more vicious alternative? I think the matter in Egypt has not reached this point, despite the fact that the awareness of the masses supersedes that of the existing frameworks. Therefore, a military coup or the «danger of Moslem groups» are merely scarecrows used to terrorize nationalist forces, of petit bourgeoisie origin, into submissive acceptance of coexistence with the existing regime.