

of an army officer they could buy. Though these plans were not approved by the cabinet at the time, all were enacted in the ensuing years in accordance with the policy of 'preventive wars.' Menachem Begin forthrightly stated the aims of such wars in the Knesset on October 12, 1955: «firstly, the annihilation of Arab power; and secondly, the expansion of our territory.» Dayan had been even more explicit in Israeli radio in February 1952, speaking of the Israeli army's «ultimate objective of erecting the Israeli empire.»⁴

In preparation for its mission, the army's ability as a mobile strike force was enhanced by the 1953 formation of special unit 101, trained in night warfare and demolition. It got its combat experience by massacring 53 civilians, mostly women and children, in their homes, in Qibya on October 14, 1953. At a time when Israeli armistice violations were twice those recorded on the Jordanian side, the Zionists called this a 'reprisal raid'. Actually it was to provide a model for the whole Israeli army. Unity 101 was merged with the paratroopers under Ariel Sharon's command. In Dayan's words, «Its achievements set an example to all other formations in the army.»⁵

By June 1956, 'Israel' had finalized its plans for attacking Egypt, and the US had given the green light by withdrawing its pledge to aid the building of the Aswan Dam. With Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, 'Israel' entered into war preparations with Britain and France, driven by a number of interrelated aims: One, 'Israel' vehemently resisted the end of British colonial presence in Egypt, as seen in its 1954 bombing campaign against Egyptian cities, hitting British and US targets among others, in an effort to sabotage the negotiations on British withdrawal from the canal and its bases. Two, 'Israel' shared France's animosity towards the Algerian liberation movement which was supported by Nasser. By joining France in war, 'Israel' hoped to elicit French arms. Three, 'Israel' wanted to prove its abilities to the imperialist powers by toppling Nasser's regime and supposedly lessening Soviet influence in the area, while securing imperialist control of a vital waterway. Obviously, this war was not fought in self-defense, for as Dayan had told Israeli ambassadors in Washington, London and Paris in 1955, «... we face no danger at all of an Arab advantage for the next 8-10 years.»⁶ Rather 'Israel' was eager to help punish Nasser's Egypt for having dared to oppose the US's cherished Baghdad Pact and to end British colonialism's military presence and economic domination in Egypt. Nasser's opposition to the traditional Arab rulers, and his support to nationalist forces throughout the Arab world, threatened the reactionary status quo on which imperialism and Zionism relied for asserting their dominance.

Covered by British and French air support (including the use of napalm), Israeli ground forces attacked Egypt on October 29th. Though failing to topple Nasser, 'Israel' did achieve several aims. The French arms and advisors sent in preparation for the tripartite aggression were the beginning of the Zionist state's first stable and large-scale military cooperation with an imperialist country, which was to lead to other alliances. Though the US pretended to distance itself from the attack on Egypt, and forced its imperialist rivals to withdraw, 'Israel' was allowed to remain in the Sinai for four months, doing reconnaissance for its next try against Nasser, and inviting foreign military attachés to view captured Soviet arms. «By 1973, weapons systems evaluation and testing would be one of the central elements of the US-Israeli 'friendship'.»⁷


Last but not least, under cover of the state of war, the Zionist forces dealt a heavy blow to the Palestinians under oc-

cupation. As the war began, curfew was imposed without warning on a number of Palestinian villages enclosed in the Zionist state. In one village, Kafr Qasim, Israeli forces opened fire on residents who were returning from their work in the fields unawares of the curfew; 51 people were killed, well over half of them women and children.

THE 1967 AGGRESSION THE MIDEAST VIETNAM

In aims and execution, the 1967 invasion of Syria, Egypt, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was an expanded version of the 1956 aggression against Egypt. This time, however, the Zionists' conduct was even more closely geared to international contingencies. Their retention of the Arab land they in-

'Israel' gets biggest share of U.S. foreign aid-\$3 billion a year plus \$1.5 billion of emergency economic aid.



vaded reflected the growth of their alliance with US imperialism in particular. While the Zionists might have won the war with their own forces, US military and reconnaissance support was essential for making the charted territorial gains in a short time span.

In 1958, the US had demonstrated its will to steer developments in the Middle East by sending the Marines to bolster the reactionary state in Lebanon against the nationalist movement. In the ensuing period, a series of events elicited imperialist-Zionist worry: the fall of the monarchy in Iraq, the government crisis in Jordan, the growing cooperation of Syria and Egypt with the Soviet Union, and later the rise of the Yemeni national liberation movement and the Palestinian revolution. By the mid-sixties, however, the US was too bogg-