

There are, moreover, indications that Cairo and Amman are preparing a new agreement to replace the defunct Amman accord, as the basis for future relations between the PLO and the Jordanian regime. This is an indication of the Egyptian regime's dangerous role. It also refutes the arguments of those who advocate relations with Egypt to strengthen the PLO's hand vis-a-vis Jordan, and other illusions about the PLO benefiting from supposed contradictions between these regimes. In fact, Cairo and Amman are constantly coordinating their efforts

worsening situation in the Gulf. Added to this is Peres' failure to convince Israeli Prime Minister Shamir of the idea of an international conference as an umbrella for direct negotiations. These facts force both the Jordanian and Egyptian regime to intensify their pressure on the PLO, in an effort to keep the US 'peace' process rolling. The two regimes aim either to subjugate the PLO to their conditions, or to exclude it from any negotiations by creating an alternative Palestinian leadership.

Second: The restoration of the PLO's unity affirmed that the PLO is a power


working to restore relations with Cairo and Amman to demonstrate that the PLO's present radicalization is temporary and will vanish as soon as Jordanian - Egyptian - Palestinian dialogue is restored.

ADHERENCE TO PNC RESOLUTIONS

The restoration of the PLO's unity was an objective necessity for confronting the threats and challenges to the Palestinian cause and the PLO. These dangers had been intensified by the division plaguing the Palestinian revolution for four years, as a result of the policies of the right-wing PLO leadership. Yet despite the PLO's renewed unity and the resolutions adopted, the rightist trend is reverting to a policy similar to its previous one. In the process, it is violating the resolutions of the unification session without regard for discipline or unity. In short, the rightists' policies are an effort to evade the PNC resolutions.

Experience has proven that the PLO's advance towards achieving the Palestinian people's goals cannot be insured without confronting the right-wing trend, forcing it to relinquish all policies harmful to the revolution. There were no illusions that renewed unity would magically dispell all problems. Rather, the process of internal struggle continues even after unification. In this struggle, the democratic and nationalist Palestinian forces can rely on the objective conditions, chiefly the fact that, until now, the right-wing leadership has been refused entry into the US settlement for the region. In the space provided by this fact, the democratic and national forces can continue their struggle inside the PLO for reform and improvement of the PLO's course, working to make it the truly revolutionary leadership of the liberation struggle.

Confronting the various attempts to eliminate the PLO and the revolution necessitates adherence to the Palestinian national program. It demands an intense and consistent struggle within the PLO's framework and on the mass level, to impose adherence to collective decisions and respect for the national consensus. The PLO's Executive Committee and Central Council are therefore required to outline ways of dealing with all violations of PNC resolutions, and to impose adherence by all.



vis-a-vis the US plan for the area. Despite differences in wording, the essence of their positions on resolving the Palestinian question is the same, and it is diametrically opposed to the PLO's own program.

WHY THE RENEWED CONTACTS?

Hassan's visits, the Arafat-Mubarak meeting and Arafat's reported upcoming visit to Cairo all indicate that something is going on, despite the outstanding differences between the parties involved. The reasons for the renewed contacts can be summarized as follows:

First: The talk about an international conference has recently lost momentum, having been overshadowed by the

factor that cannot be avoided in the Middle East equation. The Jordanian and Egyptian regimes thus find relations with the PLO to be necessary, as a means of exerting pressure aimed at influencing PLO policies.

Third: Both Mubarak and Hussein hope to capitalize on the fact that relations have not yet been normalized between the PLO and Syria. The Jordanian and Egyptian regimes will continue to use this stalemate to claim that the PLO's only option is to return to betting on US solutions. Both regimes have a role to play in achieving such a return.

Fourth: The pro-Jordanian right wing trend in the PLO was disappointed by its failure to impose its line on the PLO at the last PNC. It is thus