

agreement, it is obvious that the Jordanian monarch has completely yielded to the Zionist Labor Party's notion of an international conference.

Whereas the Jordanian regime previously espoused the participation of the USSR, Syria and the PLO in the conference, it has now dropped the demand for the PLO's participation. This is clear in that the agreement with Peres considers UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for the conference; it means agreeing in advance on the participants and limiting the Palestinian people's representation to a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Concerning the USSR's participation, the Jordanian regime showed understanding for the Israeli conditions.

Moreover, the Jordanian regime yielded to the US-Israeli demands that the conference be an initial step leading to direct, bilateral negotiations. This is the most dangerous aspect of the agreement since it means relinquishing the previous Jordanian demand for a fully empowered conference.

OBSTACLES TO THE US PLAN

Though the Jordanian regime's secret collaboration with the Israelis, and its submission to the US-Israeli conditions, is an advanced step in the UN-sponsored solution for the Middle East, a number of major obstacles remain.

Two obstacles present themselves on the Palestinian and Arab level. Without

Palestinian and Arab support, King Hussein cannot enact his agreement with Peres on an international conference. This is particularly the case after the restoration of the PLO's unity. Even though official Arab policies are on the decline, there is still no consensus on going so far as Hussein has done. The PLO, moreover, has officially adopted the concept of a fully empowered, UN-sponsored conference, based on all UN resolutions related to the Palestinian cause, and with the participation of all parties on an equal footing.

The third obstacle is the lack of an official Israeli consensus on an international conference. The cosigner of the agreement with King Hussein was the Labor half of the Israeli government. It is well known that the other half of the government - Shamir's Likud-rejects the very idea of an international conference. When Peres threatened to withdraw from the government and call for early elections, he found that the balance of forces in the Knesset was not to his favor. On the contrary, the Likud could ally with the small far-right parties to stay in the government. Peres later withdrew his threats.

The fourth obstacle is an international one, chiefly the Soviet Union's consistent promotion of an international conference that is just and comprehensive in contrast to the US-Israeli model. The Soviet conception of an international conference coincides with that of the PLO.

Knowing these facts, the Jordanian government continues its capitulationist policies, serving as the driving force for the US 'peace' efforts. In this, the Jordanian regime is supporting the Labor Party in its conflict with the Likud.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The memorandum agreed upon by King Hussein and Shimon Peres on April 11th, aims at furthering the plan for imposing joint Israeli-Jordanian administration on the 1967 occupied territories. The terms of the document attest to the desire of both parties to continue the joint administration plan, despite Shamir's rejection of an international conference and the PLO's renewed unity. The memorandum, for the first time in such a document, speaks clearly about a phased Israeli withdrawal from most of the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories. This new development is, however, nothing but a decoy to encourage King Hussein to continue his collaboration with the Israeli occupation. Both the memorandum and the original agreement on joint administration reserve for 'Israel' the right to lines of defense along the Jordan Valley. Both speak of the right of Zionist settlers to live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In this way, Israeli military control remains basically unaffected.

Responding to reports about the memorandum of understanding, Shamir told the Italian newspaper

Agreement on an International Conference - Concluded between King Hussein and Foreign Minister Peres

1. Prior agreement should be reached concerning participants in the conference.
2. Israel insists that only those countries who have relations with all concerned parties would participate in the umbrella. Jordan understands this but does not consider it as a precondition.
3. All arrangements and regulations are to be agreed upon by all participating

countries in advance.

4. The conference would break up into geographically-based, small, bilateral committees. One of these should be the Jordanian-Palestinian committee.
5. The conference is not authorized to veto agreements reached in the bilateral committees, or to impose its will on those parties.
6. Negotiations will be based on UN resolutions 242 and 338.
7. Negotiations in each of the bilateral committees is to be held independently and without regard for the course of negotiations in the other committees.
8. The Palestinian people are to be

represented in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, by trustworthy representatives who are not members of any terrorist organizations.

9. The UN Secretary General, after coordination with and obtaining the approval of the parties, calls for the convening of the conference.

10. The conference would be reconvened whenever the work of the bilateral committees is stalled. Israel stipulates that the approval of both parties is required, while Jordan views the demand of one party as sufficient.

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