

## Joint Administration Plan

- Agreed upon by King Hussein and Prime Minister Peres

## Security and Police

- Israel is responsible for security in the territories, while Jordan is responsible for policing.
- Jordanian police work in the Arab cities and villages; Israeli police work in the Israeli settlements.
- Water sources are subject to joint administration; each country has a veto right.
- Supervision and guarding of both bridges on the Jordan River is undertaken by the Jordanian and Israeli authorities on the West Bank side, and by the Jordanian authorities on the Jordanian side.

## Elections and Freezing Settlements

- Arab citizens in the West Bank have the right to vote for the Jordanian parliament; Israeli residents in the West Bank vote for the Israeli Knesset.
- No new settlements would be established in the occupied territories, and present settlements would not be expanded.
- Agreeing on the convening of an international conference with the USSR's participation. Israel demands the restoration of relations with the USSR as a precondition for its approval.

- Jordan demands the participation of Syria and the PLO in an international conference. Israel agrees to Syria's participation and objects to the PLO's.

## Jerusalem: Open Issue

- The issue of Jerusalem would be left open. Israel agrees to Jordanian presence in Jabal Al Beit and even allows the raising of a Jordanian flag there.
- West Bank lands are subject to joint administration with each party having veto right.
- The transition period is five years as demanded by Israel; Jordan demands a period of only three years.

The plan calls for cancellation of military rule in the territories. Civil affairs are to be governed by a joint Jordanian - Israeli council. The council's duties and powers are to be decided in bilateral negotiations. Israel will reduce its military presence in the West Bank. Jordanian and Israeli police forces are to be formed. Appointed Palestinian mayors would replace Israeli officers. Jordan will not be allowed to bring military forces to the West Bank. The borders will be open. Joint economic ventures would gradually be established. The detailed plan confirms that this partial solution is a stage on the way to a comprehensive solution. The time schedule and the powers of the joint council would be decided on during the negotiations.

August visit of Secretary of State Schultz's aide, Charles Hill, to Tel Aviv. Such activities aim mostly at spreading illusions about a settlement being close at hand. They lend momentum to the moves of the reactionary Arab regimes, particularly Egypt and Jordan, and assure them that the US solution is continuing, despite having so far been impeded.

The meetings between Hussein and Peres are only part of these activities. Whether or not the US solution is faltering, these meetings remain a danger for a number of reasons. Simply talking about Israeli willingness to withdraw from 85% of the occupied Palestinian territories bolsters the Jordanian regime's demagogic claims about the possibility of regaining land in return for peace. This spreads illusions about a solution that is not at all in the offing. At the same time, the process of Jordanian meetings and agreements with Israelis is a means of making the Arab and Palestinian public become accustomed to the idea of direct negotiations with and recognition of the Zionist state. This psychological warfare would eventually lead to acceptance of surrender to the Zionist-imperialist conditions.

In the absence of signing a Sadat-type agreement, the Jordanian regime is step-by-step normalizing relations with the Zionist state. The continuation of this process of meetings and agreements paves the way for a surrender no less dangerous than Sadat's. Although it has yet to reap the results, the Jordanian regime has been pursuing this capitulationist course for twenty years. Despite rhetoric about a just settlement and adhering to the 1974 Arab recognition of the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the regime is now exhibiting its readiness to enter into bilateral solutions that would totally bypass the PLO and Palestinian rights. So far, circumstances have not offered suitable conditions for the Jordanian regime to openly enter into a bilateral deal with 'Israel'. This, however, does not lessen the need for confronting the regime's reactionary policy as part of the struggle to foil the US-Zionist-reactionary plan for subjugating the people and resources of the area.

*República* in late May: «We refuse the principle of land for peace, and accept only the principle of peace for peace.» Shamir's message to Hussein is that Peres' pledge of Israeli withdrawal from 85% of the 1967 occupied territories represents only Peres' viewpoint, not that of the Israeli government. Thus, while the Jordanian regime has yielded to all the US-Israeli demands in return for an international conference, Shamir rejects such a conference and any discussion of Israeli withdrawal.

For its part, the US administration still seems hesitant about the idea of an international conference. This hesitance is actually a maneuver for gaining more Arab concessions, while reassuring the Zionist state that only a

conference that suits its demands would be held. In the first week of August, Richard Murphy, the State Department's top official on the Middle East, stated that solutions to the Middle East conflict «cannot be worked out by fiat. They cannot be dictated by the Security Council or by any power outside the region... If the conference is set up, it will not have any authority either to veto agreements reached between the parties, or to impose its will on those parties.»

## THE DANGER OF THE US SETTLEMENT

In this situation, Washington has only to keep up a certain level of diplomatic activities, such as the