

tant; nor was it an issue that could be discussed with the same ease that we now discuss things. Despite our not participating in this session, I remember that we organized forty seminars in Jordan to explain our position, saying that we are replacing our non-participation in the PNC session with forty «PNCs».

Concerning the 17th session, everybody knows that other organizations, including the Democratic Front, joined us in boycotting this session, for reasons which are well known, particularly in view of the dominance of a particular political line at this session which was held in Amman (1984), which led to the rightist trend's continuing its political option which ultimately led to the signing of the Amman accord with the Jordanian regime.

Concerning the Executive Committee, we boycotted it during the period between the PNC's 12th and 14th sessions. During this period, we all remember the slogan raised by Fatah, which controlled the PLO leadership, for keeping things as they were, i.e., keeping us outside the Executive Committee.

The question might be raised as to the reasons for the PFLP's non-participation... What were our aims with non-participation on certain occasions, and what were the real reasons for this behaviour? A review of the PFLP's literature shows that our non-participation was due to our convictions concerning essential political and organizational issues. We felt we had to use all methods available in order to have certain issues adopted in the PLO in a manner that would consolidate national unity and promote the PLO's goals. Despite our constant adherence to the process of political and organizational reform, we were not the decision-makers in the PLO.

Everybody talks about hegemony in the PLO leadership and the absence of democratic practices in its institutions. What then could we do when we face a serious political or organizational issue not approved by the hegemonic leadership. The fact was that after expending all efforts, and failing to have these positions adopted, we used this tactic of non-participation in order to bring the discussions being held behind closed doors out in public. This was a way of saying to our masses that there is an important question which keeps us from participating in the PNC, or the Executive Committee, and this question concerns not only us, but concerns first and foremost the Palestinian masses. We were seeking to draw the masses' attention to the problem presented by the hegemony in the PLO leadership, and the political and organizational results of this hegemony.

Forming the PLO's institutions and leading bodies on democratic front-like principles, that guarantee collective decision-making, is the only way to prevent the occurrence of this phenomenon. The continuation of the hegemony does not preclude the PFLP from using this tactic again.

If the PFLP's non-participation is disturbing, the hegemony and non-democratic methods used in the PLO are more disturbing. Consolidating Palestinian national unity requires a radical treatment of the political and organizational misconduct.

Concerning the PFLP's mistakes in dealing with the PLO, everybody knows from experience that we are not among those organizations that claim to always be correct. Our literature includes a review of the mistakes we have committed.

Could we say that after 20 years in the PLO, the PFLP's use of the weapon of non participation produced the desired results?

Theoretically yes. During the period that preceded the convening of the April 1987 session of the PNC, the front succeeded, by its decisive adherence to some political and organizational issues, in having the PNC cancel the Amman accord. In addition to some other resolutions that opposed the imperialist solutions and rehabilitated the PLO's alliances and national program.

We have also won the political battle when the Rejectionist Front was formed. We won by interconnecting the transitional solution with the strategic solution of the revolution.

But winning a battle comes only as a result of the political developments which force the influential rightist trend in the PLO to correct its political stands. For example, when the issue of classifying the Arab reaction in the camp of the enemies was subject to discussions at the 5th session of the PNC, we succeeded later in having the PNC adopt this classification only because the Jordanian regime had started its war of attrition against the Palestinian resistance movement. But naturally winning theoretically is different from winning practically. The rightist trend in the PLO never adhered to the resolutions.

The issue of the Palestinian national action leadership's crisis has been raised for years. Aren't you a part of this leadership? Does this crisis apply to the Palestinian left's leadership as well?

There is a difference between the bourgeoisie's dilemma in leading the national work and the difficulties that face the working class when leading this work. The dilemma of the Palestinian national movement is a part of the Arab Liberation movement's crisis. The crisis lies in both movements in the class nature of this leadership, and in the particular dilemma of the revolutionary alternative to this leadership. The continuing difficulties the Left faces contribute to extending the Palestinian national action leadership's dilemma. The historical role of the bourgeoisie has declined. It is no longer capable of continuing and concluding the national and democratic liberation tasks. At some times this class can't even maintain what was achieved. Concerning the Palestinian struggle, the great difficulties we face in this stage, could lead the Palestinian bourgeoisie to favor a political settlement with the enemy before concluding the political liberation stage. This could be seen in the political position taken by the rightist trend following the Palestinian forces' withdrawal from Beirut in 1982.

The concept of the crisis as talked about does not apply to the Left. Despite the difficulties the Left faces, the future for the Left is wide open. The Palestinian Left, due to its ideological and class nature, will continue the battle against the enemy until total victory.

It is worth pointing out that the Palestinian Left was not born as materialized Left. The process of transformation governs the Left's development. This means that the Left could have many mistakes and shortcomings which could delay reaching its historical status as the leader of the Palestinian national action.

The scopes for the Palestinian Left to take control of the revolution's leadership are subjected to several factors. First, this process is a historical one. And during this long process the achievements of the Left are accumulated until reaching these goals. Second, taking control of the revolution requires the consolidation of the Palestinian revolutionary democratic forces' efforts on all levels, ideological, political and