

ficulties. This concept might be viewed as a failure, because our experience in Jordan failed to establish a sound and solid base. At present, the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon faces so many difficulties created by several sides. However, there are insisting questions; namely: What tasks should be shouldered by over 1.5 million Palestinians in Jordan and about 500,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon? Would the Palestinian Revolution inside Palestine be able to go on with such a great effectiveness and vigour without the support and the backing of the second base abroad?

The long experience of the contemporary Palestinian struggle made it clear that to keep the dialectical link between the Revolution's forces inside and outside occupied Palestine, it is essential to establish operational bases for the Revolution in the front Arab countries, particularly in Jordan, due to its specific significance and peculiarity. Occasional failures and difficulties should by no mean make us give up these facts, which were developed into rules through the experience of the Palestinian struggle.

This is our outlook of the issue. Furthermore, our political and organizational strategy laid down by the second Congress in 1969 called for the creation of an Arab Hanoi. With this frankness, we addressed our masses and our revolution forces. By no way should we adopt empiricism as a law. It is essential to have a workplan and to lay down a strategy. Such a strategy might be modified, re-considered or developed, but there must be one.

The difficulties that confronted the Revolution's second base in Jordan and Lebanon did not urge us to re-consider the concept itself, because it is completely right, rather urged us to find out why did we fail to establish invulnerable operational bases outside Palestine. Our thorough review of this experience allows us to attribute this failure mainly to the failure of the Palestinian Revolution to establish the proper relation with the Jordanian masses and their revolutionary forces before 1970 and to the non-establishment of sound relations with the Lebanese masses and their revolutionary forces between 1971 and 1982.

In Jordan, the Palestinian Revolution disregarded and replaced the Jordanian people and the Jordanian national movement. Misled by the illusion that it can neutralize the regime by raising the slogan of «non interference in its internal affairs», the Revolution did not participate in the Jordanian masses' social-national battles.

In Lebanon, the relationship was confined to containing the National Lebanese Movement. It confiscated their role, revived opponent traditional reactionary forces, and moved behind the scenes to contact their facist enemies, including the government.

Had the Palestinian Revolution enjoyed clarity of vision and had it known how to establish good relations with the Jordanian and the Lebanese people, had it supported them against their national and class enemies, the situation would have greatly altered.

Prospects of struggle inside the occupied homeland

What are the limits of the Palestinian struggle inside Palestine? What is the exact task of this struggle and what is the actual capability to upgrade this struggle? To what extent have the slogans on this level been translated into concrete accomplishments?

The struggle of our people inside the occupied homeland is strongly linked to the struggle mounted by their fellow people in exile. These ties were marvellously manifested through the uprisings staged by the Palestinian people inside the occupied territories to back and support their revolution abroad in time of need.

Undoubtedly, there are wide prospects for this courageous struggle, as resistance ways are being continuously developed. The recent uprising staged by the Palestinian people in the occupied homeland in protest to the visit of George Shultz, the US secretary of State, provided undeniable evidence to their absolute and non-controversial rejection of the Camp David Accords, and of the Jordanian regime's option. Their uprising, which lasted for months, provided evidence to the fact that collective unified action could crystallise and safeguard against the capitulationist plans masterminded by the US-Zionist alliance, and accepted by the Amman and the Cairo circles.

The collective Palestinian will, demonstrated during Shultz' visit, is a good example to follow in the future. It might work as a first link in the chain of the Palestinian counter-attack against the deterioration and retreat scheme targeting the entire Arab World.

It is high time to accord sufficient attention to the Palestinian Revolution's first base, inside the occupied territories. This is a lesson we learnt from the past experience. In the past, the Revolution leadership did not work effectively to develop national struggle, it has rather involved itself in several problems and concerns facing the Palestinian action abroad.

In occupied Palestine, there are about two million people living under the yoke of occupation and suffering of awful and unbearable conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to exercise all forms of struggle. Once again, the significance of the first base is demonstrated.

At present, we must first work to unite the instrument of the revolution inside Palestine, through the possible coordination forms. Therefore, we should speed up work to translate the resolutions of the unification session of the PNC held in Algiers last April. We express satisfaction over the results attained on this level and call for attaining more similar accomplishments.

It is time to give priority to stepping up our military activities inside occupied Palestine, to escalate all other forms of struggle and to take the months-long uprising as our example for future action.

It is time to accord more attention to the anti-Zionist democratic Israeli forces and to extend support for their struggle against the common enemy.

Struggle inside the occupied territories has more than one strategic and direct task. It should keep the Palestinian question aflare on both the Arab and the international levels, in order to enable friendly forces to step up their solidarity campaigns in support of our cause and intensify their pressure on the enemy to force it to recognize our legitimate national rights, foremost of which the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of their independent state.

It should also push the Israelis to be convinced that there are a Palestinian people having just national rights. As «Israel» managed to introduce psychological changes in our ranks by persuading all that «Israel» is undefeatable, we should at least tell the enemy that the Palestinian people exist, and can not be ignored. Their rights have to be recognized.

We must exert every possible effort to make the burdens of the occupation far heavier than its revenues. Then and only ►