

Armed Struggle and the Uprising

Interview with Comrade Abu Ahmed Fuad

What can the revolution outside Palestine learn from the uprising?

The Palestinian people's heroic uprising came as a result of the accumulation of militant sacrifices, beginning when the first Zionists arrived in Palestine. The uprising is a qualitative product of this long militant experience. It is the result of the experience gained by the Palestinian revolutionary forces, whether in the armed struggle cells in Palestine or through military operations across the border to Palestine. In addition, the uprising is the product of other forms of struggle developed by the revolutionary leadership inside occupied Palestine. This leadership has set work programs aimed at fusing all the potentials of the masses to confront the occupation, using different means relevant to the nature of each stage and particular political situation. The organization of the PFLP inside the occupied homeland played an important role in organizing the masses in different social, trade union and cultural organizations which have become the base and initiator of the uprising. These have made it possible for the uprising to continue and develop.

This experience is full of lessons in struggle that could be used on a daily basis. This causes us to face up to these lessons and the importance of their influencing the structure of the PLO and all the contingents of the Palestinian revolution. The most important lessons to be learned by every leader and cadre of the Palestinian revolution are as follows:

One: The united national front (national unity). One of the main reasons for the continuation of the uprising in occupied Palestine is that real unity has been practiced, based on a clear and militant political line. This line was shared by all the Palestinian organizations and by all sectors of the population in the occupied territories. Therefore, what is happening in terms of a united leadership and plan is the basic factor in escalating the uprising. This lesson must be absorbed by all Palestinian organizations. This should motivate all Palestinian organizations to consolidate national unity on the political and organizational levels, and in terms of daily conduct. This would raise the level of the participation of the Palestinian masses in exile. It would also lead to developing the activities of the PLO's institutions, politically and militarily.

Two: The importance of eliminating all forms of corruption that have penetrated the ranks of the contingents of the revolution, especially the PLO institutions. The PFLP has submitted its point of view on this question more than once, particularly in the PNC and in the Executive Committee. Till now, the minimal democratic reforms called for by the democratic forces have not been made. In our opinion, this is an important subject which demands priority and continuous struggle within the framework of the PLO.

Three: The importance of collective work and adherence to the decisions of national consensus and of the PLO's central

bodies; the importance of ridding ourselves of the diseases of one-party domination and organizational sectarianism.

What are the possibilities of elevating the military aspect of the uprising - introducing more advanced weapons and methods?

No popular uprising against occupation can accomplish all of the people's aims (freedom and independence), unless it develops towards civil disobedience and then becomes an armed popular revolution. The experience of the peoples all over the world, like the experience of the Palestinian people, shows that occupiers will not withdraw one inch without being forced to do so. Therefore, we in the PFLP and in the PLO military institutions are studying how to move to the stage of using arms. We are working to facilitate the conditions needed to extend the armed revolution inside the occupied territories. We have accomplished positive steps in this direction, and the effects of this will be felt in the near future. We will use this method at the appropriate time and place, in accordance with our military plan.

How can the revolution outside Palestine support the uprising inside? What is being done to this end in military terms?

First I would like to point out that there is a clear deficiency in military activity against the Zionist enemy from across the borders, on the part of all Palestinian contingents. Therefore, I think that it is necessary for the contingents of the Palestinian revolution to increase their military activity to be proportionate to this glorious uprising of our people in occupied Palestine. This would impact positively on the morale of the Palestinian people. Conversely, it would impact negatively on the morale of the Zionist troops who would be forced into confrontations on several fronts, confusing them and making them spread their resources and manpower. True, some organizations have carried out high-quality operations. The PFLP has carried out several operations against the Zionist enemy in occupied Palestine. However, the human and material resources available to the Palestinian revolution outside allow for the development and escalation of activities. This applies despite all the well-known barriers and difficulties that confront the movement of the combatants, whether in South Lebanon, or in Jordan where the Jordanian puppet regime's forces serve as a security belt for the Zionist enemy, or in Egypt where the Camp David regime plays the same role.

Therefore, it is incumbent on the PLO's Supreme Military Council to intensify its work and draw up a detailed plan for uniting the military potentials of the Palestinian resistance, and providing the prerequisites for more military operations against the Zionist enemy. All Palestinian organizations, and specifically their military leaderships, must expend all efforts