

constitutionally committed to serving and promoting the interests of Jews and Jews only...» (p. 60).

In the chapter covering political repression, Davis examines the 1945 Emergency Laws, noting that their passage, four days after the Israeli state's establishment, means that politically and legally the Zionist state has always been in a state of emergency. Davis also notes that the 1967 war «marked both the zenith and the beginning of the decline of Zionist and Israeli achievements» (p.65). He recounts the subsequent problems faced by the Zionist state in the 1973 war and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and concludes: «... there is little doubt that the Zionist impetus and the capacity of the state of Israel to implement its Zionist objectives of establishing Jewish sovereignty and a Jewish numerical majority in all parts of British Mandate Palestine are very much impaired. Since the war option as a Zionist panacea is currently unavailable, the only alternative for the Israeli leadership, committed officially and unequivocally to the Judaization of the entire territory of Palestine, is the intensification of internal repression» (p. 60).

All in all, *Israel: An Apartheid State* will be extremely useful to those wanting to know more about the causes of the Palestinian-Zionist conflict; it will be equally useful to those already in the know as a concise and well-documented reference.

DIALOGUE TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC PALESTINE

The book distinguishes itself on another count as well, due to the author's consistent anti-Zionist stand and history of struggle alongside the Palestinian people. The second half of the book is devoted to presenting the alternative to Zionist apartheid - the PLO, and the possibilities for a democratic state in Palestine. Davis is not content with simply exposing Zionism, but is explicitly committed to an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue to promote an alternative solution which would benefit both Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews. In his view, such dialogue should be based on three truths:

1. «...as long as the 1948 refugees are excluded from any part of their homeland, including Acre, Haifa, Jaf-

fa, Beer Sheba, and reduced to the misery of refugee camps and exile, they are right to reassert their presence in the homeland from which they are excluded, if necessary by military means and armed struggle... we must support them morally and materially in this struggle.»

2. «...an Israeli Jewish people has been created in the process of the Zionist colonization of Palestine. This people must be guaranteed full rights to cultural autonomy: Hebrew schools, newspapers, clubs, etc. It cannot and must not be allowed a state of its own for the single reason that the continued existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish state must necessarily entail the continued exclusion of the 1948 Palestinian Arab refugees from all and any parts of their homeland. If all 1948 refugees are allowed to return and *all* UN Assembly resolutions are implemented, including the 1947 Partition Plan and Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, stipulating the return of all Palestinian Arab refugees or the payment of compensation, there can be no Jewish state.»

3. critical awareness.

With these truths in mind, Davis reviews the political development of the PLO in terms of how it has formulated its strategic and interim goals in conformity with international law. In general, his presentation is to be much appreciated in that it clearly shows that the PLO is the party most qualified to forward a just, peaceful solution to the conflict. On the other hand, Davis very precisely analyzes the limitations of the Israeli 'peace camp': «the Israeli Jewish peace camp strives to secure recognition by the PLO of the *legitimacy* of the continued existence of the state of Israel inside its 4 June 1967 boundaries... without insisting that such recognition must be subject to the condition that Israeli citizenship be granted to all - approximately 2 million - 1948 Palestinian Arab refugees...» (p. 102).

Davis also puts forth a number of propositions such as that the PLO should not recognize 'Israel' in its pre-5 June 1967 boundaries, but could recognize the 'Israel' specified under the conditions of the 1947 UN Partition Plan; he envisions a process whereby the two states, an Israeli and Palestinian one, would grant citizenship to all their inhabitants (present and former) and hold universal elections for their

respective legislatures, culminating in a united secular democratic Palestine, through peaceful means, in a few years. Davis' proposals also include enabling Palestinian Jews to become members of the Palestinian National Council and amending the Palestinian National Covenant (Charter) to allow Israeli Jews to remain in liberated Palestine and acquire Palestinian citizenship.

Although some of Davis' ideas go beyond the policy adopted by the PLO to date, we think that the last two mentioned propositions in particular are worthy of discussion as part of the PLO's work to build relations with democratic, anti-Zionist forces. Other of Davis' propositions, such as the first two referred here, could be understood as part of a PLO peace initiative aimed at adapting to new conditions that may be created in the course of the ongoing liberation struggle, including exploiting the contradictions that will arise in the Israeli society in this process. However, such questions must be discussed in the context of an overall analysis of all factors of the conflict. We see it as a limitation that the book does not deal with the role of imperialism, the US in particular, in the conflict, even though this issue impinges directly or indirectly on many of the strategic questions raised. At the same time, Davis mentions only in passing the international conference under UN auspices, which is in fact the peace initiative unanimously adopted by the PLO, as opposed to the false 'peace' plans promoted by the US and some Zionist forces.

The neglect of US imperialism's role in the Palestinian-Zionist conflict is reflected in a number of Davis' assessments to which we would put serious questions, for example his evaluation of the PLO's relations with Jordan. These relations can never be evaluated as a local question isolated from imperialist plans in the region, for the Jordanian monarchy has historically functioned to promote these plans, meanwhile shielding the Zionist state.

Davis notes that at the PNC's 16th session a major shift occurred in PLO policy with the adoption of a resolution advocating a «confederation between two independent states» (Palestinian and Jordanian), followed by the 1985 Amman accord with the Jordanian regime. Davis views this accord as «a tactical manoeuvre pursued under the pressure of extremely adverse conditions for the PLO regionally and inter-