

nationally, which was directed at buying time, and which can be expected to achieve nothing other than buying time» (p. 80). While it is Davis' right to hold this view if he deems it correct, it is another thing when he insinuates that those who vehemently opposed the Amman accord did so based merely on a *priori* suspicion of the prevailing PLO leadership's intentions.

Davis' assessment appears to stem from the fact that he does not deal with the existence of differing political lines and class forces within the PLO. But even more principally, it is rooted in failure to connect the prevailing status of the Palestinian-Zionist conflict at that time, with the concurrent US plans. The Reagan plan forwarded in 1982 officially appointed the Jordanian monarchy as the vehicle for absorbing and thus liquidating the PLO and the Palestinian cause. The danger of the Amman accord, and the reason it was opposed by a broad spectrum of Palestinian revolutionary forces, was that it provided the Jordanian monarch with a lever for undermining the Palestinian struggle from within, totally putting aside the independent state which was at the heart of the 16th PNC's resolutions. Davis overlooks the fact that the Amman accord was only endorsed by one Palestinian resistance organization, Fatah, and that the 17th PNC held in Amman, which backed this policy, was boycotted by all Palestinian organizations other than Fatah and the Arab Liberation Front. In contrast, it was abrogated at the unifying PNC in Algiers in 1987, attended by the major Palestinian organizations.

Another unclarity in the book concerns the PLO's policy of meeting Israeli forces that recognize the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, regardless of whether they are anti-Zionist or not. According to the author, «To interpret this policy as ascribing legitimacy by the PLO to Zionist philosophy and practice is, in the view of the author, from the political perspective completely irrational... It is not the meeting, contact or dialogue *per se* that can or ought to serve as a criterion for political assessment, but the *content and the context* of such meeting, contact or dialogue» (p. 81). This sounds reasonable but Davis neither explains how and under what conditions the PLO can avoid ascribing legitimacy to

Zionism with such meetings; nor does he directly explain what the Palestinian cause stands to gain from such contacts.

Since Davis harbors no illusions about the Israeli peace camp (the analysis of Peace Now is a strong point of the book), we can assume that his evaluation is related to his vision of the future course of the conflict, counting on continued struggle to create new realities. Davis states that current contacts with Zionist Israelis «presage the possibility, in the long term, for the Zionist movement and for the Israeli government to accept surrender in the face of the attrition of prolonged popular armed struggle and the inevitable victory of the PLO... There is every reason to expect that Israel will surrender to Palestine, probably in the framework of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations, where the Israeli Prime Minister of the racialist regime of Zionist Israel will negotiate the terms of the 'suicide' of his government with the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and future Prime Minister of the democratic Republic of Palestine» (p. 82).

What remains unclear is how PLO contacts with Zionist forces *now* promote this development. In fact, there is a great deal of concrete evidence that such relations harm the PLO and Palestinian cause. Such contacts give Arab regimes a pretext for reneging on their official boycott of 'Israel', meanwhile edging closer to the Camp David accords which ignore Palestinian rights. PLO contacts with Zionist forces, following upon Egypt's entry into Camp David, also provided an excuse for a number of African governments to restore their relations with the Zionist state, that were broken after the 1973 war. All this detracted from the PLO's role on the regional and international level, as the vanguard in the struggle against Zionism.

Similarly we miss the connection between the prediction about Zionist surrender and other future perspectives outlined in the book, such as that the Zionist leadership inherently resorts to war and repression to relieve its crises, that the fascist option has always been central to Zionism, and that in the last years, the anti-Zionist forces have been further marginalized as «Israeli Jewish society is subject to a process of escalating Nazification» (p. 85).

The connection we miss may lie in Davis' view of the decline of the Zionist momentum after 1967, not having achieved a convincing victory since. Davis gives as one example the Israeli «loss» of the Sinai and its settlements there via Camp David. Certainly this was a loss when compared to historical Zionist dreams. But this is only a partial analysis. It overlooks the important fact that imperialist influence became stronger in the region in the seventies, and that Begin's 'Israel' only embarked on Camp David because it perceived the tremendous strategic gains to be made by Egypt withdrawing from the confrontation, while the Zionist state institutionalized its strategic cooperation with the USA. Davis compares the future Israeli surrender to that of Rhodesia, but the Palestinians are not fighting 'Israel' only. They are fighting a state which has increasingly taken on the property of a military base in the area, which the US will do all to protect. Rhodesia, in contrast, had already proved itself troublesome to its imperialist allies who supported it only covertly in the final stages of Zimbabwe's liberation. It has yet to be proved that massive US aid to 'Israel' influences the society in the direction of compromise or surrender to the Palestinians, quite the contrary.

We do not ourselves claim to have a detailed blueprint of how the liberation struggle will develop in the future, what changes this will enforce on the Israeli society and how the PLO should adjust its policies accordingly. We do however think that a more comprehensive and precise analysis should underlie PLO policy on critical questions such as relations with reactionary regimes and Zionist forces.

We do not make these points in order to disparage Dr. Davis' contribution to the dialogue on how to achieve a truly democratic Palestine. Rather we hope this dialogue continues, becomes richer and more precise. We think that Dr. Davis would agree with us that the current uprising in occupied Palestine has given new impetus and possibly new parameters for this discussion, and we welcome further discussion of the topic in the light of this.

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*Israel: An Apartheid State*, by Dr. Uri Davis, was published in 1987, by Zed Books Limited, 57 Caledonian Road, London N1 9 BU.