

Actual defense needs played little part in the deliberations of the Israeli leadership. When the decision to bomb the reactor was taken by the Israeli cabinet in October 1980, «those who supported the raid replied that the amount of weapon-grade uranium in Iraqi hands was not enough to produce even one bomb.» In addition, 'Israel' three times proposed to India to make a joint attack on Pakistan's nuclear reactor, but was turned down (*International Herald Tribune*, February 23, 1987). This is despite the fact that there has never been any indication that Pakistan would use its nuclear power against the Zionist state. The real intent was demonstrating Israeli capacity to threaten and blackmail the Arab regimes and nationalist forces, while advertizing Israeli military capacity before the world. The authors of *Two Minutes Over Baghdad* estimate the Israeli Air Force to be the third largest in the world, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and the most experienced in modern air tactics and warfare. They moreover note: «... the brilliant execution of the Israeli Air Force in the Iraqi nuclear raid is probably the best possible advertisement for US aircraft manufacturers (General Dynamics and McDonald Douglas)... The Mirage III had practically no customers until Israel achieved such dramatic success with its Mirage IIIs during the 1967 Six Day War.» They describe quite openly the results cultivated by 'Israel' with this incidence of state terror: «...the annihilation of the Iraqi reactor has torn apart the rules of international behaviour previously known in the Middle East... Israel and Prime Minister Begin have created for themselves a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East.» Concurrently, the Arab world received a shock of 1967 proportions.

Perlmutter, Handel and Bar-Joseph's telling of the US reaction is also noteworthy: «You can't help but admire their technical proficiency, although we strongly condemn the action,» said one US Defense spokesman. Reagan reportedly assured the Israeli ambassador that the raid would not hurt US-Israeli relations, while National Security officials privately applauded the boldness and efficiency of the raid on a «Soviet ally». Bob Woodward's 1987 book *VEIL* revealed more about the US role: «...under the intelligence arrangement set up with Casey's approval, Israel had almost unlimited access to U.S. satellite photography and had used it in planning their raid.» The raid occurred on June 7, 1981. One month later, the head of Israeli military intelligence Maj. Gen Yehoshua Saguy visited Casey in the US where «they agreed that if there ever was a need for something special they would deal directly with each other.»

'Israel' is still banking on the fear instilled in the Arab regimes by the 1981 attack. Its blackmail is not restricted to nationalist forces, but is also aimed against reactionary regimes which are vying for US favor. In March this year, 'Israel' made a big fuss when it was learned that Saudi Arabia had obtained surface-to-surface DP-3 missiles. As noted in *Newsweek*, April 4th edition: «The missiles are not yet operational, and last week Israel hinted it might make sure they never were. 'We have a reputation that we do not wait until a potential danger becomes an actual danger,' said Yossi Ben-Aharon, a top aide to Prime Minister Shamir. It was taken as a clear reference to Israel's 1981 raid on an Iraqi nuclear reactor - and U.S. electronic intelligence confirmed that Israeli Air Force jets have been conducting intensive, low-level attack practice runs.» As of this writing, it appears the Israelis have refrained from any such attack in view of US advice. This is merely one more sign of the Zionist state's increasing integration into imperialism's global strategy.

## PARTNERSHIP

From the time of the 1967 war, the Zionist state placed itself more overtly in the context of US global strategy. This tendency became even more blatant after the 1973 war when «Israel» was only bailed out by the massive US airlift of military supplies. US-Israeli military relations assumed a more institutionalized character, with the ever increasing militarization of the Israeli economy occurring under direct US auspices. Israel Shahak gives one interesting example of this: «The main source of the increase (in Israeli military production) following the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, was the 'acquisition of whole factories in the U.S. by Sultam, Taas and Tadiran,' and their transfer to Israel, and the employment of the most developed American technology (*Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression*, AAUG, 1982; the internal quote is from Haaretz, March 7, 1977). With US-made F-15s forming the backbone of the Israeli air force, «Israel» is dependent on the delivery of spare parts and ammunition from the US in the case of a prolonged conflict.

Israeli emphasis on developing its own arms industry and the US cooperation in this venture shows that the nature of their relationship is that of partnership, not simply that between a big power and its client. As noted in *MERIP Middle East Report* No. 144, January-February 1987, «Israel controls the largest inventory of US and US-compatible arms outside the United States. More important than compatibility of weapons is the compatibility of ideology and political analysis. Here we see the offspring of the Nixon-Kissinger strategic calculations in the years following the 1967 war... The US has allowed Israel to co-produce US military equipment under license at a 'higher level of technology' than any other FMS credit recipient, according to one State Department official.»

## ANTI—SOVIET STANCE

Concurrent with its integration into US global strategy, the Zionist state assumed a more blatantly anti-Soviet stance, seeing the attainment of specific Zionist goals as inextricably bound to advances for imperialism. After the 1973 war, Rabin argued against moves towards a political settlement as follows: «Israel should try to 'gain time', he urged, in hope that 'we will later find ourselves in a better situation; the U.S. may adopt a more aggressive position vis-a-vis the USSR...» (Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle*, 1983, p. 13, quoted according to Amnon Kapeliouk, *Israel: la fin des mythes*, 1975). The Zionist leadership had thus primed itself to be a main partner in the Reagan Administration's anti-Soviet crusade, as was formalized in the November 30, 1981 memorandum of understanding article 1, clause 1: «The United States-Israeli strategic cooperation, as set forth in this memorandum, is designed against the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region.»

The 1982 invasion of Lebanon embodied the Zionists' efforts to intertwine their objectives of eradicating the Palestinian cause with other US imperatives in the region. In the spring of 1982, US Secretary of State Haig had linked three main issues the US had to deal with in the region: 'autonomy' for the Palestinians, i.e., expanding Camp David; the situation in Lebanon and the Gulf war. The Zionist state undertook to resolve two of these issues, implementing the ready-made plans for invading Lebanon in hopes of destroying the PLO, after the spring uprising in the occupied territories had made it clear