


that the Palestinian people were having nothing of 'autonomy'. While Israeli Chief of Staff Eitan proclaimed in July 1982, «The battle in Beirut is for Greater Israel,» Israeli ambassador to the US, Moshe Arens, revealed the Israeli global ambitions in his August 1982 statement: «The war in Lebanon has brought tremendous gains for the US and has changed the relationship of forces between the great powers» (cited in *Haaretz*, September 21, 1983).

The Zionist lobby in the US eagerly explained part of what Arens meant. A booklet published by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in 1983, entitled *Israel and the US Navy*, listed the benefits that had accrued to the US due to military cooperation with the Zionist state: «Israel's provision of combat data on the performance of American and Soviet systems in the 1967 Six Day War, the War of Attrition, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Some data gleaned from the 1982 Lebanon campaign has already been provided by Israel and it has offered to do more... The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has indirectly assisted USAF by proving the superiority of American aircraft over both Soviet fighters and Soviet air defenses» - a reference to «IAF successes against the Syrians... The Soviet



Union will therefore now have to devote large financial resources to replacement and renovation of the systems that have proven vulnerable... The military result of Lebanon is thus a huge implicit gain for USAF, in undermining the value of tens of billions of rubles in Soviet air defense expenditure».

Along the same lines, 57 US Congressmen directed a letter in March 1983 to then US Defense Secretary Weinberger, urging an agreement with 'Israel' on military data sharing since, in the Lebanon war, 'Israel' had used over 100 US-developed weapons systems in Lebanon, which had not previously been utilized in full-scale combat (chronicled in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 48, Summer 1983).

«We can say that we really put US technology to a real-world-test in Israel,» asserted Major General Uri Tsimhoni, Israeli military attache in Washington from 1984-86. In an interview with *Defense News*, August 11, 1986, Tsimhoni spoke about US-Israeli cooperation and joint development of NATO weapons, noting, «We really have to defeat many of the same Soviet aircraft, the same Soviet tanks, whether it's in the Warsaw Pact or in Syria or in North Korea.»

The culmination of Israeli incorporation into the US's global anti-Soviet campaign was the Zionist state's 1986 decision to join the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars). Thus 'Israel' took a step even more radical than some of the NATO allies were prepared to take. (See *Democratic Palestine* no.23 for coverage of US-Israeli SDI cooperation.)

THE ARC OF INTERVENTION

Due to the failures experienced in Lebanon, the Israeli military did undertake tactical readjustments, but these did not head in a less interventionist direction. Upon succeeding Sharon as defense minister, Moshe Arens worked to reorganize the Israeli armed forces. «An outline of his plan appeared in *Monitit* (April 1983), accompanied with a map of the areas included in Israel's strategic planning. The map has Israel in the center with an arc indicating the boundaries of its intervention. Within this arc lie Libya, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, the entire Arabian Peninsula and Iran. The temptation to extend the arc to a full circle and speculate on its boundaries is almost irresistible» (*Palestine Focus*, August 1983).

THE LAVI

The development of the Lavi fighter jet was another sign of the Zionist state's intentions to elevate its interventionist capacity and strategic alliance with US imperialism. Among the interrelated aims was procuring US funds to bail the Israeli Aircraft Industries, the biggest employer in 'Israel', out of economic stagnation, at a time when the Israeli government had no extra funds. Moshe Arens, Defense Minister in 1983-4, was the prime mover of the Lavi project. In an interview with *Jerusalem Post* (January 31, 1986), he spelled out the effects the Lavi would have on Israeli status in the region and internationally: «When we go and buy an F-16, the Arabs know we have an F-16. When we build a Lavi, they don't know what we have... And then they have to ask themselves what else have these people (the Israelis) been able to do... The plane is 50 per cent American, and represents something that has never been done in the Western world before. No other country has developed an aircraft with the U.S. as a cooperative venture -something that opens both marketing and joint production possibilities between the two countries, in addition to the obvious statement this makes about the strength of the strategic bond between us.»

In an interview with *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, February 1986, Arens also admitted that 'Israel' is in fact becoming more and not less dependent on the US. When asked if the Lavi project negated Israeli self-reliance, he said, «... we're not attaching the kind of importance that we did in past years in gaining independence, in having everything manufactured here.»

In the same period the Lavi was being developed, a US plan to fund a Jordanian Rapid Deployment Force died in Congress due to Israeli opposition.

The Lavi project was halted in autumn 1987 when the Israeli government finally conceded to the US assessment that the expenses of its production were prohibitive. Still, the Israelis (and the US) have the blueprints; even if they never produce this warplane, they can sell the know-how and technology involved. A recent issue of *Israeli Foreign Affairs* (December 1987) wrote about indications that South Africa may produce a similar warplane based on having recruited thousands of Israeli technicians and engineers who worked on the Lavi project: «When the Israeli Cabinet canceled the Lavi aircraft pro-