

The Uprising

Dual Power in Occupied Palestine

In the last few months, the uprising has not only established itself as a permanent phenomenon, but imposed a state of dual power in occupied Palestine. The resilience of popular action and organizing, even after the Israeli ban on the popular committees, stands as the latest evidence of the unity of the people and their determination to continue the struggle until achieving freedom and independence.



Deir Ammar village: «PLO — Israel No!»

The Uprising is here to stay, as even the Israelis admit.

It took months of sustained mass struggle, but it finally happened. Israeli officials, significantly enough military officers first and foremost, began to publicly acknowledge that the uprising could not easily be squashed. The first such statement came from the army commander in the occupied West Bank, Maj. Gen. Amran Mitzna; on June 18th, he stated that the occupied territories would never return to the previous relative calm, but that the uprising would probably continue a long time. In the same period, Chief of Staff Dan Shomron and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin both noted the increased use of molotov cocktails and

firebombs against their troops. Israeli government sources estimated that about 800 firebombs had been thrown at their forces since the uprising began, almost half of them in the preceding few weeks.

By mid-July, Shomron had become more explicit. While in Beit Sahour, he stated, «The Israeli army cannot control the will of the Palestinians. The uprising may continue for years... the real question is: To what level of violence will this conflict continue... Our real aim is to decrease the level of violence» - a tacit admission that it cannot be stopped. Earlier, Maj. Gen. Amnon Shahak, head of the Israeli military intelligence, had stated that «the Palestinians still accept the PLO as the ultimate leadership of the uprising

in the occupied lands even though a new local leadership has emerged...» (Associated Press, July 1st). As reported by the *Guardian*, July 9th, 70-80% of the Israeli army's present general staff see the need for territorial concessions.

It is no accident that it was first in the military that the futility of beating down the uprising was acknowledged. It is the army that is faced with that very task and thus the first to see the reality. Moreover, the tangible effects of the uprising on the military have become more marked over time. As reported by *Israel and Palestine*, May 1988, «...each Jewish male must now serve in the army at least 65 days a year (in addition to his 3-year-long draft period, plus longer reserve duty for of-