

workers was only 17.5% in 1984, in contrast with African Jews for whom the comparable ratio was 84.4%. These figures are typical indications of the degree of injustice, oppression and discrimination against our people under occupation, as compared even to the lowest strata of the Jewish social scale. They expose the hideous racist character of Israeli policies within the so-called green line.

In brief, we can say that the enemy has enjoyed additional sources of income which increased its wealth and enabled it to reconcile its security and developmental needs, without disturbing the living standards of the settler population. This saved the Jewish population from exposure to social pressure. Quite the contrary, social conditions became steadily better relatively quickly. This was possible thanks to abundant resources from abroad, as well as labor productivity at home. These resources were distributed according to a rigorously applied taxation policy, aiming at bridging social gaps, while preserving the position of the private sector. State regulations guaranteed the productive character of wealth and of the profits of the private sector which was made to function in the interests of the state, not the other way around.


These are the most outstanding features of the social policies of the Zionist entity, as well as the principal changes in this sphere. Once more, the supreme strategic objectives of Zionism appear to be the regulator and motivator of the social policies, which should be carefully studied.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC THEORY AND MILITARY CAPACITY

Along with the socioeconomic sphere, the field of strategic theory and Israeli military capacity has undergone noticeable development over the last forty years; hence the necessity of considering all these innovations in a comprehensive perspective. Rather than ruminating on our old information and analysis, we must delve into the core of the changes and evaluate them, in order to formulate a counterstrategy of confrontation, based on science and facts, not on dreams and illusions.

The results of the 1973 war may have been the fundamental turning point for the Israeli strategic theory. 'Israel' seemed to realize that the realities of the June 1967 war, and its army's

The Israeli Python 3 air-to-air missile exhibited at Paris air show in 1983



easy victory over the Arab armies, were no longer valid after 1973. The gap between the Arabs and 'Israel' could be decreased in a few years; the Arabs could exploit the change to the degree that the balance of forces could shift in their favor, unless substantial alterations were made in Israeli strategy. The objective of the Israeli strategy after the 1973 war was not, therefore, simply preserving the balance of forces in their favor. Rather, it was increasing their clear superiority, and creating a technological time gap that could not easily be bridged by the Arabs within a limited number of years.

Together with this change in the strategic theory of the enemy, there were other changes in the Israeli concepts of the balance of forces, «the enemy» and the elements of power. The changes were by no means unrelated to the essence of the supreme strategy on which the Zionist project in Palestine was based and which it has always been trying to apply in practice.

For 'Israel', national security is a concept equal to existence itself. Therefore, it needed to adopt a new way of viewing its enemy, not only the actual one, but also the potential enemies it may designate for nationalist, religious, ideological and technological reasons. When calculating the balance of forces, 'Israel' should take such considerations into account, through full estimation of all the human, technological elements, etc. Thus, it is impossible to look at the elements of power only from the military aspect. All the economic, human, i.e., demographic, and security aspects must be taken into consideration.

Accordingly, in recent years, 'Israel' acted in a way that projected its influence far beyond the frontlines with the Arabs. Nowadays we hear about projects and plans going as far as hitting the nuclear reactor in Pakistan, to prevent it from the production of atom bombs which might threaten Israeli security in different circumstances. Moreover, important changes have been made in the structure of the Israeli military institution, followed by changes in the economic structure and in the military industry in particular. We are going to point out some of the aspects of the enemy's strategic thinking which have affected its military capacity:

First: One of the most important lessons 'Israel' drew from the 1973 war concerned the human aspect, i.e., the necessity of increasing the human capacity of the military institution. The number of both reserve and active-duty soldiers has been increased, to enable 'Israel' to mobilize a number of soldiers not much less than the Arab armies in time of war. The professional and permanent personnel of the Israeli army now number a quarter of a million, besides the reserves. More serious is that this increase was not at the expense of manpower employed in the civilian sector. It was balanced by raising the rate of employment, in spite of lagging immigration, and by using Palestinian Arab labor. In addition, there was a qualitative change in the level of the personnel engaged in the security and military field, with the introduction of technologically advanced equipment and the wide use of electronics.

Second: Besides depending on imported arms, the Israeli army began to use advanced weapons manufactured in 'Israel'. The Israeli military industry has already made great progress in providing the army with its munition needs as well as different kinds of arms, together with modifying old imported weapons to meet the requirements of accelerated technological development and of the circumstances in which they would be used. The important factor which continues to limit the Israeli army, as clearly stated by Israeli leaders, is armaments, not the