

Another sure sign that the document addresses the US administration is that it omits the Palestinian people's rights to repatriation and an independent state, which are rejected by the US and 'Israel'. If there remains any doubt, one can refer to Bassam Abu Sharif's own statement as printed in Abu Dhabi's *Al Ittihad* on June 26th: «Direct contact between the PLO and the US administration is required now more than ever.»

Ironically, though the Arab regimes reaffirmed the need for Palestinian statehood at the recent Algiers Summit, some right-wing forces in the PLO are

reverting to the tactic employed - and quite unsuccessfully - over the years by reactionary Arab regimes who have wagered on the USA to pressure 'Israel' to make some concessions.

Perhaps the authors of this document were not surprised by Shamir's perfidious rejection of the proposal as «nothing new». Maybe they were even encouraged by the US State Department's cautious welcome of the proposals as having a «constructive tone» and «some positive points.» But as could be expected, the US spokesman avoided unconditional recognition of the proposals by saying they were not

«authoritative», meaning that more official concessions are wanted from the PLO.

If the US administration is eventually convinced to recognize Palestinian rights, this will come as a result of the continuation of the current uprising and other forms of Palestinian struggle. This document coming at this time only serves to detract from the uprising, particularly since it challenges the PLO's unity which is an important prerequisite for the uprising's continuation. ●

The 1988 Camp War — A Stab in the Back

The most recent war against the Palestinian camps in Beirut distinguished itself from previous camp wars in that the contending forces were both Palestinian organizations. However, in essence, this war was a continuation of the foregoing attempts to end the Palestinian revolution's presence in Lebanon.

From the time the Amal movement began besieging the Palestinian camps in 1985, it was clear that such attacks were part of a broader move to resolve the Lebanese crisis without fundamentally changing the political and social injustices which have led to this crisis. Instead, the Palestinians of the camps became the scapegoats under various pretexts, while different factions contended for a bigger share of the pie in a

sectarian redivision of power.

Yet from 1985, it was equally clear that these attempts to disarm and defeat the Palestinian camps would not succeed. The fighters and camp population in general proved their ability to resist shelling, siege and starvation, in order to maintain their right to self-defense and to continue the struggle against the Zionist occupation of Palestinian and Lebanese land.

Shatila residents fleeing shelling



This year's camp war consisted of a series of battles between the forces of the Fatah Central Committee (Arafat) and those of the Fatah Provisional Leadership (Abu Musa) beginning in May and continuing until the first week of July. On the surface, this was an instance of inter-Palestinian fighting, a phenomenon which has always been condemned because of the threat it poses to Palestinian unity and struggle, and because only the Zionist enemy stands to gain. However, this fighting took on even more dangerous dimensions because it occurred on the backdrop of two other, widely divergent developments: the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories and the pending presidential elections in Lebanon. While the first development seemed to herald a positive new stage for Palestinians in Lebanon, the second gave rise to a series of military and political maneuvers aimed at pacifying West Beirut and eliminating 'disruptive' elements that might stand in the way of electing a president without the necessary reforms. These maneuvers included Israeli aggression on South Lebanon, the 'resolution' of the situation in the southern districts of Beirut, and intense US diplomatic efforts to find a presidential candidate acceptable not only to its traditional allies in the Lebanese Front, but also to the Syrian government.

THE WAR IN THE SOUTH

Continuing their ongoing struggle against Zionist occupation, and aiming to support the Palestinian uprising in