

themselves.

The calls also differentiate between the various components of the international community. Calls no. 14 and 15 recognize the Soviet Union's leading role in the efforts to convene a fully empowered international conference, while call no. 17 terms the Soviet-Palestinian agreement, regarding legitimate Palestinian national rights, a just basis for which there is no alternative in a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem. In call no. 29 the work of solidarity committees is recognized, and they are asked to pressure their governments to recognize the Palestinian state and exert economic and political pressure on 'Israel'. Call no. 28 notes the non-aligned countries' support for the Palestinian cause.

On another level, the UNL is obviously monitoring positions that are subject to change under the impact of the uprising, such as that of the EEC which is commended for originally not renewing certain economic treaties with 'Israel', then criticized in call no. 29 for signing three agreements despite continued Israeli repression.

The calls also express solidarity with other liberation movements. Call no. 20 designates June 25th as a day of struggle against racial discrimination, and solidarity with the people of South Africa and all people subject to this. Call no. 23 expresses solidarity with all the people struggling for freedom and independence, naming Namibia and Chile as well, while joining the international cry for the release of Nelson Mandela.

The uprising's democratic outlook is also reflected in relation to the Israeli society. Call no. 21 salutes the Jewish progressive, democratic and peace forces that support the Palestinians' national rights. In call no. 23, Jewish doctors who have treated the wounded of the uprising, and journalists who have exposed the occupation's brutality, are singled out for commendation, and urged to work to increase consciousness among Israelis since «a human being who accepts the repression of others can never be free.»

## THE ARAB ENVIRONMENT

The uprising has posited the struggle of the masses under occupation as the central dynamic in the process of liberating Palestine. This, however, implies no indifference on the part of the UNL to the Arab political scene. By combining the concrete political positions expressed in successive calls, a clear picture emerges of the constellation of forces in the Arab world, and their respective roles.

The first concrete reference to Arab politics occurs in call no. 5 (January 5, 1988), terming the Jordanian regime «traitorous» and accusing it of trying to exploit the uprising. Coupled with this is a call for boycotting *Al Nahar*, the pro-Jordanian newspaper in the West Bank - the first of many measures that expressed and enforced the marginalization of pro-Jordanian figures by the uprising. Succeeding calls reject the various initiatives of Jordan and Egypt, naming the Arab reactionary forces which are most prominent in the attempts to abort the uprising, and pinpointing their alliance with US imperialism. This critique is generalized in call no. 10 to include all Arab states who welcome Shultz's shuttles, while call no. 13 denounces the reactionary attempts to delay the Summit of the Uprising.

The calls also recognize the role of the opposing camp in the Arab world by praising the mass demonstrations in support of the uprising, while saluting the Lebanese nationalist masses and the people on the Golan on a par with the Palestinians in the 1948 occupied territories - indicating where the uprising sees its main sources of support. The Arab nationalist states are dealt with in relation to concrete events: Algeria is praised for its initiative to convene the Summit of the Uprising; Libya and Algeria are commended for their efforts to reinforce the PLO's unity and align all Arab nationalist forces against the Shultz plan; meanwhile, there are repeated calls to Syria to normalize relations with the PLO.

The calls also define the supportive environment which the Arab world could constitute for the uprising. This is

most obvious in the UNL's demands to the Arab summit. Call no. 12 makes clear «to the Arab kings and presidents that the Palestinian people do not seek money; they are ready to suffer hunger and poverty, but never to surrender.» The uprising's demands to the summit are chiefly for a united Arab stand, publicly declared, refusing Shultz's plan, while adhering to the PLO's status, Palestinian rights and the concept of an international conference. These basic positions of support for the uprising are linked with a call for releasing political detainees from Arab jails and instating democratic freedoms, so that the Arab masses can «join with the masses of the victorious uprising» (call no. 17).

Notably, the calls do not spell out specific demands to the Arab masses other than designating occasional days for solidarity demonstrations. However, what the UNL would like to see in the Arab world can be inferred from references to Lebanon. Besides calling for the Palestinian-Syrian-Lebanese nationalist triangle of steadfastness, the UNL says: «The struggle of South Lebanon and the struggle of the uprising should unite in order to speed up the process of ending the era of Camp David in the Arab area, in order to begin a new era for a new struggle» (call no. 29). The fact that the UNL does not elaborate on what is expected of the Arab masses is surely connected to the generally low level of the response of the Arab national liberation movement to the new situation created by the uprising. As one sees from the UNL's directives in Palestine, it always gears its guidelines to the concrete realities and possibilities. An upsurge in the struggle of the Arab masses and progressive forces would surely spur a new dialogue on how to enact change in the whole area, which would then be reflected in the UNL's calls.

## ARMED STRUGGLE

There has been a tendency in the media to contrast «the revolution of the stones» with the Palestinian armed resistance which began in organized