

to stop paying the fines and bails determined by the Zionist courts, and the fees exacted by the appointed municipal councils, as well as to boycott security clearances. In call no. 15, the people were requested to boycott the new ID's which the occupation authorities tried to impose in the Gaza Strip, as a new means of control. There was resistance to the Zionists' confiscation of old ID's and the issuance of new ones, but this proved to be the only measure called for by the UNL, which has been impossible to implement strictly. It was subsequently dropped from succeeding calls, as it proved impossible for the masses to move without ID's in the current stage. Nonetheless, due to the basic successes achieved, the UNL was able to call a day of total boycott of the civil administration on June 19th. With call no. 29, issued November 20, 1988, a new step was taken with the call for judges in civil courts to resign.

The tax boycott has been successively tightened, starting with resignations and followed up by the masses' and strike forces' physical confrontation of the tax authorities, as was prominent in the war of the taxes which raged in West Bank towns and villages last summer. Another economic measure was added with call no. 21 which urged people to withdraw savings from Israeli banks.

The boycott of Zionist goods began with the specification of a few products in call no. 3 (sweets, cigarettes and dairy products), growing to include both agricultural and industrial products for which there are local replacements, as of call no. 18 issued May 29, 1988. It became more than a consumer boycott as of call no. 21, with the stipulation of not allowing the export of Israeli products to the Palestinian market, nor advertising for them in the local press, as well as pursuing any one who continues to market them. A key to the enforcement of the twin boycott of Israeli products and tax payment has been the commercial strike which began in the early days of the uprising and has been sustained ever since.

The work boycott stems from the general strike that prevailed in the Gaza Strip from the first days of the uprising. Like the commercial strike, it could not have been sustained indefinitely without organization. While in the case of the commercial strike, call no. 5 set a schedule allowing people to buy necessities, it was apparent that a general strike could not be enforced indefinitely until people had alternative sources of livelihood. The solution found by the UNL was to totally boycott work in Zionist settlements as of call no. 6, while those with jobs in 'Israel' should prepare for gradually boycotting this work, meanwhile observing the declared general strike days. As of call no. 17, people were urged to boycott the employment offices connected to the occupation authorities. Call no. 26 advised workers not to remain overnight in 'Israel'. Call no. 29 stipulated that fruit pickers should boycott this work in 'Israel' - hitting the occupiers' economy during the harvest season.

The other side of the boycott coin is building popular authority, as a prerequisite for sustaining civil disobedience. Reviewing the calls over a year's time, one is struck by the transition from the first half of the year, when the predominant concern is what is not to be done, to the second half, when the calls are more oriented towards what is to be done, i.e., building the political, economic and social basis for people to organize their own lives. While the first calls stress days of general strike, protesting the occupation and its various acts of repression, by the summer, general strikes are called in order to build popular authority - consolidating the popular committees, rebuilding demolished houses, holding a national health day, etc.

## POPULAR AUTHORITY

«Our people have begun creating a new national lifestyle and consolidating their national authority» (call no. 13, April 12, 1988). This began with very simple things corresponding to the direct needs of the uprising - calls for doctors to help the injured, for all to

help needy families, the families of martyrs and prisoners, etc. With the continuation of the uprising, the directives become more specific, both in the form of action prescribed and the assignment of tasks to different sectors of the population, in accordance with their role and assets.

Already from the contents of call no. 1, it is obvious that popular committees are in place and carrying a major organizational role as are the strike forces. By the time we reach call no. 18 in the late spring, there are, in addition to neighborhood committees, specialized committees for health, general security, guarding of property and crops, information, popular education, agriculture, storage and distribution of supplies, and family solidarity committees for helping the needy, as well as committees for special sectors: merchants, workers, students, etc.

The new thing is not only the proliferation of committees, but their new way of working and their initiative which is commended in the UNL's calls as experience to be spread. A newsletter issued by the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees in July 1988, states: «The national and mass organizations' previous general attitude of holding fast to traditional and narrow methods of carrying out activities amongst the masses has now, in the midst of the uprising, found a new kind of flexibility and maneuverability; furthermore, the mass organizations have done exceptionally well in creating variety in their work that has allowed for the active participation of large segments of the population in the work of popular committees in villages, camps and cities, in neighborhood committees, medical committees and land rehabilitation committees.»

From the beginning the UNL exhibited clear awareness that while the strength of the uprising lies in the participation of all the people, still different sectors can and should have different roles. The distinction is made on both a class and functional basis, i.e., how to best utilize the skills and resources of different sectors for the