

## IV. ENLARGING THE SCOPE OF THE UPRISING

With the eruption of the intifada in the 1967 occupied territories, there were significant supportive activities in the Palestinian land occupied in 1948, culminating in some large demonstrations and the eruption of the war of fires against Zionist property. These activities aroused fear in Zionist circles, where the propaganda machine had long been working to spread the idea of «Arab-Jewish coexistence» under the banner of the Jewish state. Some Israelis described these activities as a catastrophe and a mortal danger. Of course, there is nothing surprising about this reaction, for if the uprising proves Israel's failure to absorb the results of the 1967 war, then the eruption of the uprising in Israel itself means the failure to absorb the results of the Zionists' usurpation of Palestine in 1948. This gives rise to a major question concerning the future of the Zionist project in Palestine and its potential for continuing.

Nonetheless, the activities in the 1948 occupied territories have not yet developed from supporting the uprising to actually partaking in it, due to subjective and objective factors. The most important of these is the objective difference between a situation where our masses face the danger of transfer, settlement-building, the iron fist, expulsion and collective detention, and a situation where the Palestinians are considered second-class citizens. Moreover, there is a subjective difference between a community where the Palestinian revolutionary forces have the decisive role, and one where other forces are relatively active and influential.

Although we do not belittle the importance of the militant activities of our masses in the 1948 occupied territories, yet they have not moved to the level of participation. So we should put this issue on our working agenda by all possible means, and in cooperation with the active Palestinian forces and the (democratic) Jewish forces (in the 1948 occupied territories), in order to enlarge the scope of the uprising, so that it covers all of Palestine. Our success in achieving this goal is a qualitative weapon which has a tremendous potential for affecting the enemy. We should not belittle the importance of this weapon, for it will have a decisive effect on the process of shortening the distance between declaring and achieving independence.

## V. THE ROLE OF PALESTINIANS IN EXILE

The fact that more than half the Palestinian people live in exile obliges us to shoulder a special responsibility for activating and organizing them, for the battle requires that all participate. Since the outbreak of the uprising, the center of the national struggle has moved to the occupied territories, but that does not justify belittling the importance of the second base of the revolution, which is outside Palestine. It is not viable to concentrate periodically on one base and ignore the other, as happened in the past when it seemed that we were focusing on the exterior base rather than on the interior. Priority must be given to the occupied territories, but that does not at all mean belittling the importance of the role that our masses in exile may play. Furthermore, the history of the contemporary Palestinian armed revolution is to a great extent the history of the remarkable role of the Palestinians in exile, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, at a time when our masses in the occupied territories were experiencing very hard times.

It is true that the circumstances began changing in the last decade, especially after the 1982 war, but that does not mean

*Democratic Palestine, June 89*

that the role of the masses in exile should not continue and escalate, even though this occupies the second place in our priorities at this stage. There are many duties to be performed by the masses in exile in order to support the uprising - from campaigns to collect donations, to political and informational work in support of the PLO and the PNC's resolutions, to armed struggle across the borders to Palestine. However, all this requires a programmatic policy from the PLO, in order to benefit from these tremendous potentials and use them to guarantee the continuation and escalation of the uprising.

Bearing in mind the difficulties the PLO faces vis-a-vis the various Arab regimes and the latter's failure to meet their commitments towards the uprising, self-reliance is the only way to insure that sufficient support is provided for the intifada. When thinking about activating the role of the masses in exile, we must take note of the hindrances that the Arab regimes put before the PLO's independent activity among the masses. Nevertheless, these hindrances should not stop us from advancing towards fulfilling this mission. It is our duty to exert all efforts in our long and hard struggle to put our national independence into effect.

## VI. DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN THE PLO

Mobilizing and organizing our people's potentials and fulfilling the tasks needed to reach freedom and independence require a revolutionary instrument that can undertake these tasks efficiently. It is no longer a secret that one of the dangers facing the uprising is the level and type of unity that exists within this revolutionary instrument, and the level and nature of the PLO's institutions. The policy of individualism and the domination (of one group) still prevails in the Palestinian work, while corruption and favoritism are still trademarks of our national institutions. Work is hindered in almost all the PLO's mass organizations and unions. This abnormal situation should not continue, especially in the era of the intifada which necessitates a «revolution within the revolution» and a rearrangement of all our institutions, work programs and internal relations, in order to attain a really qualified and unified revolutionary instrument which can rise to the level of heroism which is being practiced daily in the occupied territories.

Democracy must be extended in all our institutions. We must rely on the principle of proportional representation in forming our organizational bodies, institutions and unions. All fields of Palestinian national work should be unified so that we would have a single united revolutionary instrument, rather than a series of centers and offices. We should address the world with a united line, policy and instrument, provided that the process of reform takes place, and the PLO's institutions are reconstituted on the basis of proportional representation. However, this does not rule out the organizational and ideological independence of each component organization of the PLO.

Achieving democratic reform is moreover necessary in order to guarantee maximal support to the uprising, via a single channel, i.e., the UNL. It is also important to conduct the political battle with the same efficiency as the masses are fighting the battle of stones and molotovs against the Zionist enemy. To be loyal to the intifada and its central slogan -freedom and independence, we need such a comprehensive reform. This is an objective necessity and not a question of the petty interests and calculations of some Palestinian officials who turn their backs on democratic reform. ●