

otherwise preferable Jordanian option would ultimately lead to a Palestinian state on both banks of the Jordan River.

Two of the dangers Heller sees as remaining even after such a settlement are: «secessionist sentiments among Israeli Arabs» and Israeli access to water. Generally, Heller's proposals are technocratic: arrangements that assuage Israeli security fears and meet Israeli conditions. He assumes, for example, that Palestinians in their new «state» would still work in Israel and/or that Israel can compensate for their cheap labor via a needed technical overhaul. He totally overlooks the relations and structures of colonialism that have evolved over the years, and their political, social and economic impact on both the Israeli and Palestinian societies. Despite all his talk of the advantages of peaceful settlement, his model ultimately rests on continuing Israeli military control: continued reliance on pre-emptive attacks, retention of Israeli-manned early warning systems in the already demilitarized Palestinian state, and even more US aid and strategic cooperation.

Now that the intifada has concretely proved that the Palestinians are quite serious about building a truly independent state, and are already laying its foundation, one wonders how this reality fits with models such as Heller's. In the introduction to his book, he writes that the weakening of the PLO by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 makes his ideas even more feasible than when they were written. What now, if the PLO is strong?

ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS

Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s: Its Politics and Economics (Zvi Lanir, editor, 1984) is also from the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University; the contributors are from this center's permanent staff headed by Aharon Yariv, former head of military intelligence. By its own definition, the center concerns itself with: «The concept of strategy... in its broadest meaning, namely, the process involved in the identification, mobilization and application of resources in peace and war to strengthen and solidify the national security of the state of Israel.» This book includes a historical review of many factors related to defense and security policy, but the focus of many of the contributors is on the crisis of the Israeli economy. Lanir introduces the study as follows: «Most experts agree now that Israel has reached a critical stage where it must reassess the challenge to its security and even its defense doctrines as the result of the weight of economic constraints.»

Writing about the regional arms race, Aryeh Shalev points out that Israel's ability to enlarge its armed forces in the future will be limited because it has already reached its capacity to allocate funds to defense; on the other hand, the technological arms race can only push defense costs up. In the period since this study, Israel failed to fundamentally resolve its economic problems, although a number of the symptoms have been inhibited. Thus, this issue is important in measuring the effects of the intifada, if only in terms of the added defense outlays required in the attempt to suppress it.

Reviewing this study in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* 56, Summer 1985, Uri Davis writes how one is struck by the authors' awareness of the possibility of the state's collapse, noting: «The fact that the state of Israel controls the most powerful military machine in the Middle East does not in itself

redress its fragility.» Yariv himself writes: «Any Israeli defeat in armed conflict spells out - and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future - the end of its sovereignty.»

WITHDRAWAL FOR SURVIVAL

Harkabi adopts an even more comprehensive approach: «In most countries the national debate centers on what policy will yield the best results, whereas in Israel the debate is existential: what policy is less perilous to the country's existence? Mr. Begin repeatedly said that if Israel withdraws it will find itself in 'mortal danger'» (*Israel's Fateful Decisions*, p. 50). Harkabi contends the opposite: «Withdrawal will leave a state that will have to defend itself and live in difficult conditions. Annexation will lead to safer borders, but it is doubtful whether the state will survive to defend them.» He bases his contention on three main criteria:

1. Demographic: «Israel must withdraw from the West Bank not because of any obligation to Jordan or the Palestinians but in order to prevent a demographic disaster that would put an end to Israel as a Jewish state. Furthermore, it is the only way to put an end to the conflict» (op. cit., p. 119). Based on estimates that if prevailing trends persist, Palestinian Arabs will constitute 45-50% of the population of 'Greater Israel' by 2000 or soon afterwards, Harkabi warns that this is comparable to the PLO dream of a democratic Palestinian state, and a strategic problem much greater than the geographical problem that would accompany Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Concerning the other side of the demographic balance - Jewish immigration - Harkabi sees no reason for optimism. He terms the settlement movement a success only in physical terms, but a failure in human terms, since immigration is dwindling. He refutes the belief that annexation will awaken a fresh wave of immigrants, saying: «Jews may be attracted to a Jewish state, but not to a country with a mixed and unsettled population» (op. cit., p. 48).

2. Time is not on Israel's side: Harkabi views the younger

