

Violation Since Shamir's «Peace Proposal» - April 1 through October 1, 1989,» which documented the following: 178 Palestinians were killed by gunfire (58 of them 16 years of age or younger), while an additional 36 were killed by the other means; 3,387 were injured by live ammunition, of them 1,211 were children, in addition to 12,816 injuries from other causes; 250 houses were demolished in this six-month period, while 60 were sealed; 1,674 curfew days were counted, aside from partial and night curfews, while there were 1,434 arrest raids and 204 tax raids; 37,740 fruit and olive trees were uprooted and/or burned; over 14,000 Palestinians were in prison, 2,124 of them administrative detainees.

In all, 21 were expelled from their homeland, under the emergency laws, in 1989. (Many others were administratively expelled on pretexts of visa violations, despite having been born in Palestine, or lived most of their life there. In the Ramallah area alone, about 150, mostly women and children, have been expelled in this way since the start of the intifada, cruelly breaking up families in a policy of creeping mass transfer.) It is striking that the only human rights violation that was reduced in the second year of the intifada was «official» expulsion - 21 as opposed to 33 in the first year. This, like the opening of West Bank schools, shows that international condemnation does affect Israel. At the same time, it is obvious that Israel hopes to use such token improvements to deflect criticism of its continuing gross violations. Unfortunately, much of the international media has played along with this game, whether intentionally or not, as detailed coverage of the intifada has almost dropped out of the spotlight.

### **Israel can't penetrate the intifada**

There were obvious links between the political and physical attacks, and the attempts to penetrate Palestinian unity. One was the increased use of the border guards, which quickly led to

the unprovoked assault on Nahhalin on April 13th, when the guards and army together killed five residents of this liberated village near Bethlehem, and injured at least 50 others, many of them in their homes. The idea of deploying the border guards against the intifada was to partially relieve the army after its sustained failure to dent the popular momentum. Another malicious intent was to divide among Palestinians themselves, since Druze resident in the Zionist state are recruited into the border guards. In Israeli society, the guards are considered «second-rate» compared to the army; this force is also heavily manned by Oriental (Arab) Jews. So the Israeli Orientalists delighted in finding forces that supposedly know «Arab traditions» - creating the picture of Arabs fighting Arabs.

However, this tactic failed on two counts. The border guards were no more successful than the army against the intifada, despite committing rampant atrocities. Moreover, the attempt to divide various sectors of the Palestinian people failed dismally, especially at the Druze Initiative Committee organized a series of activities to show that the guards are not at all representative of their community. Druze delegations traveled to Jerusalem to donate blood for the injured of the uprising, and women relatives of border guards met with West Bank women to express their solidarity with the intifada. Druze leaders pledged to impose social and religious sanctions against any Druze committing murder in the occupied territories - a method that has previously proved effective in the struggle of the people of the Golan Heights against the occupation. In the end, the tactic only served to accentuate the racism pervasive in the Zionist society. The Israeli press was filled with scandals about the border guards from the perspective that they were substandard and moreover «Arabs» and Kahane supporters, whereby mainstream Zionists would like to claim innocence of their crimes. It is also noteworthy that the deployment of the guards

didn't change the basic ratio of army killings: regular soldiers continued to shoot-to-kill, while the guards were charged with terrorizing the Palestinians in more «weird ways - atrocities against women, etc.

The second intersection between the attempt to break Palestinian unity and the increase in violent repression is related to collaborators. While many collaborators changed their position under the impact of the intifada, those who remained in the service of the occupation began to take an even more sinister role. This was apparent in the number of incidents in which collaborators joined Shin Bet agents in hunting down and summarily executing local leaders of the uprising. In view of this, one can understand the intensified war on collaborators, needed to protect the masses, preserve united ranks and build the independent society and state. Also for this process, the UNL issued detailed regulations.

It was typical that some western journalists seized this opportunity to write about the intifada, after having «forgotten» it for months. This feeds into the atmosphere of promoting Shamir's plan as if it were a reasonable chance to stop the violence, meanwhile neglecting the fact of the occupation's daily violence against Palestinians. In general, 1989 was marked by a dangerous international tendency to focus on what the PLO should do to make a solution possible, while putting to the side the reality of the uprising and Israeli repression. The PLO bears main responsibility for working to correct this situation, by gearing its peace offensive to protecting the intifada and promoting the conditions for its continuation and escalation. But we also call on progressive forces everywhere to increase their solidarity in the political and informational fields. The importance of international solidarity cannot be underestimated. In view of the Israeli government's intransigence, the intifada is heading for a long struggle; it will be a permanent feature of the next decade, in the struggle for freedom and independence. ●