

important that the PLO define its priorities. Our first priority is Palestinian unity - the unity of the masses and their adherence to the PLO and its program. When this is the case, the other links - Arab and international - will not be able to ignore the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian link will give the PLO momentum for entering the international scene. In fact, the achievements realized in the first year of the uprising were made *before* the PLO leadership began to give gratuitous concessions. Due to the Palestinian cohesiveness, for example, King Hussein was forced to sever legal and administrative ties with the West Bank. Many other gains were made such as Security Council resolutions 605, 607 and 608.

So, why don't we stop running after the mirage of the US solutions? Why don't we firmly declare: No to the Shamir plan, No to the Mubarak plan, No to Baker's plan and No to any other plan that doesn't recognize our inalienable national rights? We have the ability to resist all pressures if we preserve national unity and are committed to the national consensus and the resolutions of the PLO's leading bodies.

How has the intifada impacted on the PLO itself? The democratic reform needed to make a qualitative change in the PLO's performance hasn't occurred. What is needed to implement these reforms?

The issue of democratic reform in the PLO has always been a priority for the PFLP and other national and democratic forces. Today, this takes on greater importance in view of the uprising. Our commitment to the uprising requires the process of democratic reform. The formula should be as follows: the uprising in Palestine and democratic reforms in the PLO's institutions in exile. The uprising demands that the PLO institutions be transformed from their present shabby, bureaucratic state into new, militant and mass institutions. What is keeping the Palestinian masses in exile from being mobilized in support of the uprising - politically, materially and militarily? It is the present situation in the PLO. Out of loyalty to the uprising, we are obliged to implement democratic reforms.

Theoretically, democratic reform means developing the relations among all parties in the national front, in form and content. Whenever major political developments occur, there should be a review aimed at resolving any contradiction or discrepancy that may have arisen between the objective factor of the revolution and its subjective factor, i.e., its leadership. Our ultimate goal is to mobilize all the Palestinian masses in and outside of Palestine; at the same time, the various Palestinian organizations represent all classes of the people. Therefore, the reform process should aim at rearranging the ranks and adjusting the internal bylaws in a way that reflects all the changes taking place in the revolutionary process. In this way, democracy and collective work will be consolidated and all forces will be mobilized. Dealing with the uprising with old means and institutions will not contribute to its development. The uprising has spread to all towns, villages and camps in the occupied territories before some of the PLO offices had woken up to the fact. Individualism, the hegemony of the single organization, bureaucracy and corruption are still not being seriously dealt

with. The PFLP, together with other organizations, has been struggling for remedying these negative phenomena. We have presented many proposals - most recently the paper submitted to the Central Council meeting in Baghdad. We have not achieved tangible results, but we will continue our struggle.

More and more forces are gradually seeing the importance of reforms and their direct influence on our national cause. The uprising is developing and is, at the same time, surrounded by conspiracies. The performance of our institutions should not remain incapable of meeting this challenge. The negative phenomena affect the level of support given by the masses in exile to the intifada, and the masses in exile should shoulder their responsibility to bring about reform. Reform should become a mass demand. The PFLP will make democratic reform a priority in the next PNC, with a new membership. The first priority for us will be a critical review of the PLO's policies since the 19th PNC was held in November 1988.

The PLO has restricted its attention almost exclusively to the 1967 occupied territories. How can all of the Palestinian people take part in the battle for freedom and independence?

Achieving the goals of freedom and independence requires mobilization of all our people, everywhere, especially those in the 1948 occupied territories, because they live closest to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and most importantly, they live in the Zionist entity. The Zionist enemy is most fearful of our people in the 1948 occupied territories moving from supporting the intifada, to participating in it. It is necessary for our people in the 1948 occupied territories to be directly involved in the uprising, yet I do not feel it is possible for them to be fully involved at present. I dare say the PFLP made a mistake when during the first year of the uprising, we raised the slogan of the participation of the masses in the 1948 occupied territories in the uprising. We changed this slogan into advocating more support to the uprising from these masses, as a step towards actual participation. When we say full participation is not possible now, we mean that the objective and subjective conditions for this are not yet ripe, in contrast to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Palestinians in the 1948 occupied territories are exposed to many forms of discrimination and repression, but not to the same degree as the masses in the 1967 occupied territories. I want to point out some of the differences between the objective and subjective conditions in the two areas. On the objective level, the enemy has confiscated 50% of the West Bank and over 34% of the Gaza Strip, but about 30% of the land belonging to the Palestinians residing in the 1948 occupied territories. Moreover, the enemy has confiscated over 80% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip water resources. There is also a vast difference in wages, educational systems and political and civil freedoms.

The level of political organization is much higher in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The organizations there are underground and have adopted different means of struggle than those adopted by legal organizations that exist under certain restrictions in the Zionist state.