

which was only brought up in this case because the victim was a Circassian officer in the service itself. In a previous case, involving the killing of two Palestinians captured in an operation in 1984, Israeli Attorney General Zamir had resigned because his intention to have the killings investigated was blocked by the government and Peres in particular. An opinion poll at that time showed that 70% of the Israeli public backed Peres against Zamir. «Facing a choice between security and the law, they chose security,» commented the *Washington Post*, June 8, 1986.

The enemy outside

Under the impact of the uprising, previous Zionist security failures have been revived. This is clearest in Lebanon which Israel invaded in 1982, on the assumption that by eradicating the PLO there, mass resistance in occupied Palestine could be easily squelched. This have failed, the opposite now seems to be the case: The uprising has spurred more struggle against the Zionist occupation from South Lebanon, after some years of preoccupation with secondary conflicts. Though not at the level aspired to by Palestinian revolutionaries, guerrilla attacks increased against Israel in 1988, as compared to 1987. In the first half of 1989, UNIFIL counted 98 attacks against the IDF/SLA in South Lebanon. By the summer, Israel was involved in a virtual war with major attempts to cross the border to occupied Palestine occurring roughly weekly, several Israeli soldiers killed and ongoing attacks by the Lebanese resistance. In early August, the Israeli army reported 31 attempts to cross the border in the last two years, claiming only two of them to have been successful.

Israel continued its policy of «pre-emptive strikes,» launching an average of two air raids on Lebanon each month over the past two years. As Syria reinforced in Lebanon in conjunction with the war between General Aoun and the nationalist forces, the statements of Israeli officials showed that Zionist policy on security had not changed: In mid-August, Likud MK of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Yehoshua Saguy, stated, «Abandoning Lebanon's air space and coastal waters means a direct threat to Israel's ability to defend its borders.» At the same time, Israel widened its circle of declared enemies in June, by banning Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah as «terrorist» organizations on a par with the Palestinian resistance organizations.

At the same time, Rabin has been forced to admit failure to extinguish popular resistance on two fronts: «We have learned the hard way, that it is impossible to uproot terror easily.» According to his count, 30 new anti-Israeli guerrilla organizations have been formed since 1982, while the army budget for fighting insurgents from Lebanon has grown four to seven times (*Haaretz*, September 11, 1989).

The Jordanian front has also become a cause for concern. As of October 1989, there had been nine attacks against the Israeli occupation from across the Jordan River, four of them involving Jordanian soldiers acting on their own, and the rest launched by

the Palestinian resistance. After rockets landed near an Israeli settlement in early September, a prominent settler said on Israeli radio, «It's like we're returning to the situation of 20 years ago.» In September, Israel was reported to be installing an early warning system along the Jordanian border like the one on the Lebanese border, whereas before observation posts and mobile patrols were deemed sufficient.

The uprising has focused the bulk of concern on the previously ignored Palestinian core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but Israeli officials and experts continue to devote attention to the Arab aspect of the confrontation, though to a lesser degree. An article of the former intelligence officer, Alouph Harevan, of the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem was written in 1988, but appears oblivious to the ramifications of the uprising. Its main conclusion is that «Israel's strategic situation in the 1980s has been better than in any previous decade» due to the absence of an Arab war coalition (*The Jerusalem Quarterly*, Winter 1989).

During the period of the uprising, Israeli statements about the «Arab threat» have been fewer and usually related to specific things. The January 10, 1988 *Sunday Times* reported that Israel was considering an attack on a «secret Syrian nerve gas factory.» Israeli officials have expressed concern about newly acquired Arab ballistic missiles, Syria's acquisition of a more advanced bomber from the Soviet Union, and the «Iraqi danger» after the Gulf war. In February 1989, Shomron said that «Israel must take the war to the enemy,» threatening a return to the policy of «pre-emptive strikes,» never abandoned in relation to Lebanon. However, the possibility of Israel staging a larger military operation, as a diversion from the intifada is fraught with risks. The failure of Israel's assassination of Abu Jihad to stop or even lessen the intifada, proved that limited surgical operations are futile.

However, advocates of «pre-emptive strikes» remain, as exemplified by Reuvan Pedatzur's July 14, 1988 article in *Haaretz*, which argues for a return to this policy as practiced in 1967, in view of the Arab states' acquisition of more sophisticated weapons, and because such strikes constitute an essential and permanent part of Israel's strategic doctrine. Military production also continues, to enable such options to be realized if decided upon: Israel's development of the Arrow missile in cooperation with the US; the May 1988 test launching over the Mediterranean of the potentially nuclear-tipped Jericho II missile; the September 1988 launching of the first reconnaissance satellite in the Middle East; and the May 1989 unveiling of the Markava Mark 3 tank which can be sealed for chemical, nuclear or biological warfare.

Territory - Security drawback

The most immediate and clear-cut effect of the intifada on Israeli security thinking is diminished belief that more territory means more security. This was dramatically highlighted by the May 1988 emergence of the Council for Peace and Security, grouping roughly half the senior officers of the reserves, and headed by Aharon Yariv, former head of military intelligence ►