
munal strife whose dynamics will continue the confrontation but in no way further the...peace process» (*American-Arab Affairs*, Winter 1988-89).

Yitzhak Klein and Joel Peters of the Hebrew University outlined a «Strategy for Peace» in the *Jerusalem Post International Edition*, January 21, 1989, noting :«The reluctance of mainstream Israeli opinion to recognize the Palestinians themselves as Israel's main adversary, and hence its main potential interlocutor, has a logic of sorts. To recognize that the Palestinians are Israel's legitimate opposite number in the dispute means acknowledging that they are entitled to *something* by virtue of their existence.»

Repercussions beyond the military

From failure to end the uprising militarily, and the resulting demoralization and loss of stature of the army, stem all the other questions about Israeli security, pertaining to settlements, international relations, demography, relations to the Palestinians in the Zionist state itself, economic considerations, etc., which we will address below.

Settlements - A provocation

Our examination of settlements in the first part of this study showed that their role in security is ambiguous; they are more related to the drive for control of the land than to defense needs. The uprising, and the international push for a political solution that accompanied it, led part of the Zionist leadership to clarify their position, as when Rabin said on Israeli radio, May 2nd, that settlements don't necessarily contribute to security with the exception of those in the North, Golan Heights, Jordan Valley and Arava, but that they do symbolize the «return to Zion.» However, the overriding phenomenon is polarization on the role of settlements, which parallels the controversy concerning territorial compromise.

Those who continue to oppose any withdrawal also maintain that settlements have a security role. Shamir and Sharon are the most outspoken proponents of this line. In an interview printed in the *Washington Report*, September 1989, Sharon said that the following in answer to a question about self-rule for the Palestinians:«...people must understand, the settlements are not an obstacle to peace. On the contrary, the settlements are a very important factor in our security. Once we manage to accomplish our plan, the possibility of granting that autonomy becomes wider». Here it is obvious that security is doublespeak for demographic and military control that would preempt any concessions to the Palestinians. On May 7th, Arens stated that the settlers are the main obstacle to a Palestinian state.

If such statements are often rhetorical, let us look at what the Israeli government has actually done concerning settlements, as an indication of the importance attached to them. In the first year of the uprising, two new settlements were established in the West Bank, and the year ended with the Labor-Likud coalition agreement - a compromise - to create eight more settlements within a year. In 1989, at least two new settlements have been

established, while the settler compound in AL Khalil (Hebron) was expanded. Throughout the period, the Housing Ministry has pushed for building new houses in existing settlements. While this is clearly a drop compared to previous years, we cannot attribute it solely to the impact of the uprising, for settlement-building had already slowed in the mid-eighties due to economic constraints. This summer there was extensive land confiscation in areas of the West Bank for expanding settlements, and roads to settlements and military outposts, while the government was reported to have a new plan for expanding settlements in Jerusalem.

Ironically, the intifada has actually spurred an attempt to revive the settlement boom begun by Begin's government in 1977. An article in *Haaretz*, September 1, 1989, was entitled:«Despite the intifada. Also because of it.» It reported that the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip grew by 10.3% in 1988; a slightly higher increase is expected this year; and more families have applied for places in settlements than could be accommodated. This increase is much less than in earlier years; still it is noteworthy because of its political connotations. As explained by one of the new settlers:«I'm very fearful, but we came to settle here despite the intifada. The intifada has strengthened our feelings that we have to show the Arabs we aren't afraid of them.» Another family quoted in the article had moved from Hadrea (Israel), because Palestinian Arabs had begun moving into their neighborhood. In the West Bank, they said, «We don't see Arabs and don't have social contact with them.»

Although the uprising was from the start directed against the occupation army, the settlers obviously sensed it as a threat because it reasserted the Palestinian ownership of the land they had colonized. This was seen in a dual response: Settler attacks on Palestinians began four days after the uprising; meanwhile, there was a settler exodus from the Gaza Strip, where many of the settlements serve as weekend farms, and the residents have houses in Israel as well. The second phenomenon contrasts sharply with data from the height of the settlement drive when 90% of applications were for places in the Strip, it being considered relatively safe (*Al Fajr*, June 17, 1983).

In purely physical terms, the settlers have not been particularly threatened; in the first year of the uprising, they killed at least 16 Palestinians and wounded 107 more, whereas three settlers were killed, one of them shot by a fellow settler supposedly guarding her, in the march on Beita village in April 1988. Despite these objective realities, the impact was immediate:«Suddenly it is dangerous to drive on the roads and it is impossible to sell a flat. With more time passing, the situation becomes worse. The settlers suddenly found themselves on the margin of the Israeli society. They are aware that the society is no longer willing to pay for them.» wrote Dan Margalit in *Haaretz*, May 12, 1988. ●

To be continued in the coming issue.