

First: It will be difficult to transform military operations launched from across the border into a people's war in the classical sense. This is due to the lacking demographic dimension which is an important factor in the people's war. A people's war means drowning the enemy's army in the sea of the popular masses, and stripping the enemy of its ability to maneuver freely and employ its advanced weaponry. The enemy will then be forced to submit to the logic of the revolution in the battle. This same process means simultaneously raising the efficiency of simple, popular means of struggle. In view of the lack of the demographic factor, military action will continue to be bound by many objective conditions that are beyond the control of the Palestinian revolution. Guerrilla warfare is based on fast attacks and retreats. It requires adequate qualifications in order to inflict the highest possible losses in the enemy's ranks, meanwhile minimizing the casualties in the ranks of the revolution.

Second: Launching military operations in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, i.e., reviving the experience of the Gaza Strip in the late sixties and early seventies, is conditional on several reservations. One is the fear of harming the popular nature of the uprising. Another is that the enemy will use military operations in the areas of the intifada activity as justification for bloody massacres.

Third: The geographic nature of the West Bank and Gaza Strip mitigates against transforming the uprising into a classical people's war as was waged in Viet Nam, China and Cuba.

These reservations should be taken into consideration, lest the armed struggle be at the expense of the intifada.

The uprising is a qualitative new mode of struggle. It is a violent political struggle that includes a form of armed struggle, in addition to all the other forms - violent, non-violent, struggles for specific demands and political struggles. All of these forms are dialectically connected, which gives the uprising many of the characteristics of people's war:

1. It involves broad sectors of the popular masses in daily resistance. This has partially stripped the enemy of its control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In practice, the enemy is now trying to reoccupy these territories captured over twenty years ago.

2. It utilizes simple means which a broad range of the people can master, while the enemy can't employ its advanced war technology.

3. It forces the enemy to fight according to the logic of the uprising. The enemy leaders were obliged to invent new training methods, unlike the methods traditionally used by regular armies.

4. It highlights the concept of liberated areas, applying this through relative liberation from the rule of the occupation forces, military government and civil administration. A Palestinian national authority has been built up alongside the occupation authority. This is clear in the masses' adherence to the directives of the United National Leadership.

The forms of popular struggle utilized by the uprising up till now are, however, incapable of forcing the enemy to retreat, although many achievements have been realized. The intifada has made the occupation costly for the enemy, but not to the point of turning it into a losing enterprise. Much greater human

and economic losses will have to be inflicted on the enemy, in order to bridge the gap between the former and the latter. Inflicting human losses in the enemy's ranks will push the Zionist leaders to reevaluate their political calculations. From the beginning, the uprising has aimed at inflicting as many economic losses as possible. On the other hand, the enemy is waging a war of attrition against the Palestinians primarily in human terms and secondarily in economic terms.

In order to continue this war for freedom and independence, we must enter the battle with reversed priorities - human losses first and economic ones second. This can only be done via reactivating and escalating the armed struggle. Therefore, we must broaden the confrontation front to include areas other than the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The experience of the past two years has proven that in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the uprising is the most proper form of struggle. The territories occupied in 1948 should be another front, complementing the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The popular resistance committees and strike forces of the uprising have become firm and extensive structures, but their activities have been limited to the cities, villages and camps of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They mainly function to protect the inhabitants from the army and settlers' attacks, and to punish collaborators, though there have been some operations against the Israeli army in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. We feel that there is a possibility to expand the work of the popular committees and strike forces to include areas besides the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Some sections of these structures could be transformed into popular guerrilla warfare groups, basing their activities on armed action and sabotage in the Zionist state. We have all witnessed the enemy's confusion and distress when fires were set on farms and forests. The enemy will be even more alarmed, and their losses will be heavier, if such fires are also set in factories and other enterprises and there are operations against military posts.

In order for the uprising and the military action to complement each other, there should be well-planned, successful attacks from outside, and escalated military and sabotage actions in the 1948 occupied territories, along with the continuation of the popular uprising. This alone will transform the occupation into a losing enterprise in human and economic terms. It necessitates an overall review of the experience of armed struggle that responds to the new conditions. The mistakes of the past should be corrected, and right and left extremism should be eliminated. Organization has an important role in developing and escalating the uprising and armed struggle, as does a realistic revolutionary political line.

### **Internal Israeli contradictions**

This section will examine the effects of the uprising on the Zionist entity. We will not include a discussion of the essential characteristics of the Zionist entity: aggression, expansionism, colonialism and organic ties with imperialism. We feel that no matter how developed and effective the uprising becomes, it will not change all of these characteristics. Such a change necessitates qualitatively different objective and subjective conditions. Rather, we will focus on the Zionist entity as a body that can be