

unity of the main participant forces; and developing and diversifying the methods of popular confrontation. It is especially necessary to be ready to face two interrelated and dangerous options toward which Israeli policy is heading: the instigation of civil war, using the settlers, on one hand; and mass expulsions on the other. A very important question arises: Would the intifada resort to arms to at least defend itself against the racist Zionist violence that aims to uproot the Palestinian people from their homeland? This would constitute a turning point for the intifada, so its advantages and disadvantages must be thoroughly examined, and requirements for this eventuality must be prepared if need be.

We must examine how to practice more solidarity with the detainees, and to revive the protest campaigns against repression, if this can even partially bridle the occupiers' terrorist practices. We must not pay less attention to the provision of material aid to guarantee the intifada's continuation and provide

the masses with the minimum requirements of life, so they can go on struggling. Again comes to the fore the question of harming the Israeli economy and interests at vital points, for the more losses the intifada causes to the enemy, the greater its chances of victory.

Yet the basic issue remains that of the political line which can insure the continuation and development of the intifada. We must discuss frankly and realistically the difference between putting forward the interim program which adheres to the national rights of the Palestinian people on one hand, and putting forward the strategic program and considering the intifada responsible for realizing it on the other. The main issue at present is not setting the line of demarcation between adhering to basic principles on one hand, and farfetched slogans and a foolhardy trend on the other. Most important is to determine the dividing line between political flexibility on the one hand, and the trend of gratuitous con-

cessions, which squanders Palestinian rights and interests, on the other. Let us put aside accusations and suspicion; let's assume good faith on the part of all. Then there can be an objective discussion to agree on the limits within which flexibility remains within the realm of tactics aimed at isolating the enemy, meanwhile reinforcing the forces of the revolution in occupied Palestine, and providing as much support as possible from outside, so that flexibility will not turn into a strategy whereby a solution, any solution, becomes the ultimate target. That would involve moving from one concession to the next, to the point of relinquishing the basic national rights, and subsequently aborting the intifada and liquidating the Palestinian cause.

Furthermore, I want to focus on a thorough examination of the relations between the various forces that constitute the revolution, those which play a vital role in leading and developing the intifada. We stress the unity of these forces as an essential condition for the

