

intifada's continuation. We also stress the dialectical relationship between the unity of these forces and the PLO's unity. Consequently, we call for a real discussion of the different aspects of unity and struggle inside the PLO. Although this unity sometimes seems superficial and lacking a firm base, to neglect it means pushing for division with catastrophic effects on the intifada. Nevertheless, clinging to unity at all costs, even if some parties violate the collective resolutions of the PNC, becomes a hindrance for the true nationalists, preventing them from playing their role, alongside the masses, defending the slogans of freedom and independence.

These are issues to be seriously addressed. In this context, we give great importance to the PFLP's political position and militant practice. We consider this position one of the main factors in determining our own position.

2. On the Arab level

The intifada's entering its third year raises many serious questions on the Arab level, although they are not new to us. They are the result of a bad situation to which we Lebanese communists pointed frankly and clearly. The tragic shortcomings are not limited to the disgraceful state of the Arab world watching the intifada for two years, while the Palestinians were fighting alone - with the exception of the Lebanese National Resistance against the Israeli occupation, and Syria's role as the sole Arab state confronting Israel and Zionism. Even worse than just watching were malicious endeavors by some Arab regimes to pressure the PLO leadership to give more concessions, in order to contain and abort the intifada, and consequently destroy the PLO's credibility. These endeavors aimed to cancel the PLO's role and turn the Palestinian representation over to Jordan once again, or to Jordan and Egypt jointly, with a weak collaborationist interior leadership, mandated by the PLO in the initial stage, only to be put aside later. To make a long story short, we

can conclude four main lines regarding the tasks of supporting the intifada on the Arab level:

1. Confronting the Arab reactionary maneuvers, especially the Egyptian regime's 10-point plan which is but a mechanism for implementing Shamir's plan. Foiling this and other similar projects - which will increase whenever the intifada develops and the situation becomes more awkward for Zionism, imperialism and Arab reaction. This should be the major task of all the forces of the Arab national liberation movement, and not of the Palestinian people and uprising alone.

2. Pressuring the Arab regimes to adhere to the Arab summit resolutions concerning the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people - without this diminishing Arab obligations towards the Palestinian cause, and the political, moral and financial support that should be given to the intifada.

3. Working to create an Arab popular and official progressive center, grouping the regimes, forces and parties which adhere to the slogans of the intifada and have interests in its success. We call for reviving the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front on a new basis, including the Arab popular movements and main progressive parties in addition to the regimes. We also give utmost importance in this domain to the Palestinian - Syrian - Lebanese nationalist alliance, which requires first of all, improving relations between the PLO and Syria, the latter being the major base of the Palestinian struggle and the major force confronting Israel and Zionism. Thus we join our voice to the conscious voices in the PLO, who call for an end to viewing relations with Syria from a perspective of tactical maneuvering, because these relations are a vital strategic issue and could have a tremendous effect on the intifada. This is the only condition for restoring the militant Palestinian-Syrian-Lebanese nationalist alliance. It might constitute the impetus capable of surmounting the obstacle of the US-backed, Israeli rejection of the intifada's demands and the Palestinian people's rights. Moreover, the Palesti-

nian - Syrian - Lebanese nationalist relationship constitutes the cornerstone for the unity of all sincere Arab nationalist forces, and for more effective Arab support, wherein the stand of Libya, Algeria, Democratic Yemen and North Yemen play a pioneering role, in addition to the popular movements and parties.

4. The intifada has revealed the depths of the crisis of the Arab national liberation movement on two levels. First is the responsibility for the crisis of the movement's current class leadership. The second is the crisis of the supposed revolutionary alternative to the presiding leadership. We must review the position towards the intifada in terms of the size of support, and the influence it has internally in each country as an element for crystallizing the conditions for revolutionary change. Then we must plan how to develop this position on the intifada. The position towards the intifada not only reveals the state of mass apathy, but specifically the state of disarray in the leadership of the Arab national liberation movement and the popular movement. The situation on the mass level appears as bad as the official situation, and the situation of the revolutionary leadership is not better. To avoid a theoretical argument about whether or not such a leadership exists, we hasten to clarify that we simply mean the various national and pan-Arab leaderships of the forces committed to the tasks of national and pan-Arab liberation, and the general upshot of relations between these leaderships. Our deep awareness of the crisis does not encourage us to call for solidarity with the intifada organized by these forces, for although such solidarity is needed, it will not achieve the required minimum in the current conditions.

Our thinking is directed mainly towards the role of the intifada in solving the Arab national liberation movement's crisis. The intifada's role in deepening this crisis could be the first step towards solving it. Yet great efforts are needed on the two levels. First is the reality of the intifada itself ►