

and the state of the struggle in each country. The second must be the outcome of serious political and ideological debate aiming to define the principles of a new Arab revolutionary movement: the revolutionary theory on which it should be based, methods of struggle, the forces making up the movement and the organizational frameworks for coordinating internal relations. These are not the immediate goals of the seminar on supporting the intifada, but the discussions will highlight them.

### On the Lebanese level

The praise we hear about the role of the Lebanese national and progressive forces does not make us feel satisfied. On the contrary, it reinforces our critical outlook, aiming to discover and redress deficiencies. The Lebanese arena played a role in inspiring the intifada, and developing the Lebanese national resistance is the greatest contribution to supporting the intifada. The struggle for a national democratic solution in Lebanon entails the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation troops, confirming Lebanon's Arab identity, restoring national unity, foiling the divisive Zionist project, and having really democratic political reforms, based on total negation of political sectarianism, and establishing the state's executive, administrative, legislative and military institutions on democratic foundations.

The struggle for such a solution contributes to the Palestinian intifada. Nevertheless, all the above is not enough to make us stop thinking of how to restore the broader and unique role played by the Lebanese arena in the seventies. This role was restored after the Israeli occupation, with the rise of the Lebanese National Liberation Front and the battles to liberate the mountains and the southern districts of Beirut and the other militants acts that led to victories against Israel, the Marines, the multinational forces and the sectarian regime of Lebanon. It is now very urgent to revive this role whether the Arab solution agreed at Taef succeeds or not. Restoring the

state of revival entails, first of all, restructuring the relations among the Lebanese nationalist forces on the basis on commitment to the national democratic, non-sectarian program. The other requirement is establishing the Palestinian-Lebanese nationalist relationship on foundations of true solidarity. Stress should be placed on the role of the Lebanese nationalist forces and masses in supporting the intifada, protecting the camps and maintaining the Palestinian revolution's armed presence - to be used in fighting for liberation.

In turn, the Palestinians must support the Lebanese nationalist forces' national program and struggle against Israel and the internal reactionary forces. Yet the decisive factor in this revival lies, as we noted before, in restoring the Syrian - Palestinian - Lebanese alliance.

### 3. On the international level

When seeking stronger international support for the intifada, we must first of all make use of the general sentiment of sympathizing with the intifada and consequently with the Palestinians' legitimate national rights. There is now an unprecedented international consensus on supporting the intifada, which equals, or even surpasses the consensus on supporting the Vietnamese revolution in its final stages. But this sympathy is being exploited by some imperialist, Zionist and Arab reactionary circles, who portray it as a result of the PLO's concessions, and not the result of the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and revolution. This portrayal aims to elicit more concessions, and we must be alert to these dangers. International support is necessary to reinforce the intifada, not to replace it. If the revolution lays down its arms and the intifada is suppressed, world support would be reduced to pity, and pity does not retrieve rights or restore a usurped homeland.

The second important matter is how to turn this world sympathy and solidarity into pressure on the Israeli occupation and its US protector. It is

no secret that Israel is the only obstacle to solving the Middle East crisis, and the US is shielding its obstinate position. Developing the international support campaign would reinforce the position of the Palestinian side in talks with the US, and increase the latter's isolation, helping to show that the position of the US administration is not only contrary to the world consensus, but also to US interests, especially those of the American people. Moreover, great efforts should be exerted to influence American public opinion in favour of the Palestinians. The role of American public opinion was very important in the Vietnamese struggle, and the Palestinian cause is as much an American domestic concern in view of the strategic US-Israeli alliance and the interlinked interests between Zionism and US monopolies. Here we must not forget the importance of acquiring more support from Western Europe, because its position influences American public opinion and eventually the US position.

All this should not lead to any confusion. In such a long, fierce war, the revolution must have clear priorities. In our view, top priority should be assigned to consolidating the strategic alliance with the non-aligned countries, other liberation movements and revolutionary parties, and the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. Such strategic alliance is the main guarantee of long-term active support to the intifada. The leadership of the intifada and the PLO should give this matter the importance it deserves. Current developments in international relations and the tasks imposed on the great powers and their agenda of vital issues, in addition to the difficulties facing the socialist countries - all these factors reinforce the importance of consolidating alliance with the Soviet Union and socialist countries. This demands exceptional efforts, and a firm position, as well as knowing how to gain the suitable support, in order to withstand pressure and confront those who try to find easy solutions to the regional conflicts, no matter what the price.