

The Damascus agreement

The Damascus agreement to end the camp war is a result of all the factors mentioned above. The terms of this agreement are much better than those offered earlier in the conflict and categorically rejected by the PNSF. (These had included points such as total disarmament of the camps and their being patrolled by the Lebanese Army's 6th Brigade which became a party to the conflict.)

The Palestinian fighters' bravery and the PNSF's correct political decision enforced an agreement whereby Palestinians retained their light weapons in the camps. Heavy arms were to be removed, but when the time came, there were none to mention. This dispelled the myth of the «incredible arms build-up» in the camps, which the attackers had used as a pretext. At the same time, it attested to Palestinian capacities as guerilla fighters. Moreover, the agreement affirmed the right of our people to carry arms in Lebanon, in order to pursue the struggle against the Zionist enemy. Thus the essential aim of the attackers was not conceded to.

Beside having attained better terms in the agreement, the PNSF had a prime motive in signing the Damascus agreement. This was to relieve the miserable situation of our masses, which we outlined in brief above. As such the agreement was welcomed by the inhabitants of the camps.

In short, the Damascus agreement reflected the balance of forces, both the one generally prevailing and the one created in the battle of the camps. It is not such an agreement to which we ultimately aspire. Yet we consider it the best possible in the given circumstances. Its implementation provides a base for repairing breaches in the Palestinian-Lebanese nationalist-Syrian relations, in order to redirect the struggle against the main enemy.

Identifying the dead in Shatila



Shatila, June 1985.

