

The clause went on to lay out procedures designed to prevent this from reoccurring, as well as declaring that it would impose a punishment of three years imprisonment and hard labor on offenders.³⁰ The registration process being referred to here is the population registration (the *nufüs*), not the registration of property (*emlak*).³¹ This is the best explanation I have found, which is to say I have found no logical explanation. In Palestine, as we have seen in the excerpts from *A Survey* and Ruedy, this claim has not been made regarding the elite or regarding evasion of the population registration commission. In Palestine, apparently it was the *small* landowners who feared *their own* conscription and *any form* of taxation.

Chapter One of this dissertation traces the decades-long process of issuance and implementation of property-tenure reform laws in the Empire and in Palestine. It will be shown there that when this law was issued in late 1860, the implementation of reforms had only begun to take place selectively, experimentally, in a few selected cities of the Empire. It would be another decade before the empire felt ready to dispatch registration commissions beyond capital cities and into the countryside. Chapters 2 and 3 examine from different angles local responses to the *emlak* commissions tasked with recording the district's properties *explicitly* for tax purposes. Chapter 4 is a case study of court cases involving the generation that followed the generation who lived through the first implementation of

³⁰ Frederic Ongley, *The Ottoman Land Code, Translated from the Turkish* (London, William Clowes and Sons Ltd., 1892), 116-117.

³¹ The modeling of early population registers (*nufüs*) on *temettuat* (profit) registers will be discussed in Chapter 1.