

services came to only about 7 percent of Palestine's national income.³³

However, in a footnote, they concede, "Since 1936 was a year of open hostility, this *may* be less than in peaceful years" [emphasis mine]. In other words, they selected data on *one* exceptional year that fits with their assumption of limited interaction and separate "economies," and chose to ignore the years preceding and following the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. Besides their reliance on selective data, their analysis and conclusions hinge on the obvious different social and economic characteristics of the two communities without delving into the underlying process of mutual impact and government policies.

Another example of this variant is the work of Horowitz and Lissak.³⁴ In general, their points of emphasis and argument are similar to Halevi and Klinov-Malul. However, in addition to economic differences between the two communities, they stress the cultural, social, and political differences, and their "ecological segregation." In the economic sphere, they also speak of competition faced by the Jewish economy from the "Arab economy" in the labor and product markets because of the cheaper costs of the latter. The competition in the labor was because of "a surplus of agricultural labour [sic] [which] *appeared* in the Arab economy" [emphasis mine] at the turn of the twentieth century. No explanation was offered as to how and why this "surplus labor" made its "appearance." An

³³Ibid., 38.

³⁴Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Origins of the Israeli Polity, Palestine Under the Mandate* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978).