

yearly workdays in 1931, 1935, 1939, respectively).” This “shows that the income of urban labor was definitely higher than the value added per worker in Arab agriculture.”<sup>63</sup> There are several problems here.

First, Metzger’s assumption of 250 workdays is completely unrealistic. It is a well-known fact that most of the available wage employment was casual, temporary, and seasonal with the exception of that associated with war efforts starting in mid-1940. However, Metzger’s assumption of 250 days worked fits neatly with the “pull” effects of his dual-economy model. Even assuming that 250 working days were available, and given the relatively small difference in earnings between agriculture and urban wage labor, especially for 1935 and 1939 (about 10 percent), it is hard to believe that a peasant would leave his land and family to go work in urban areas. The exception to this would be if there was sufficient family labor to compensate for his labor. Otherwise, peasants did work on a casual basis to supplement their incomes. Peasants who hired out on a regular basis, when and if available, were mostly those who either completely lost their land or could not eke out a living from what land they owned (i.e., those who “earned” much less than Metzger’s average “agricultural product per worker”).

In addition to the “typical” factors acting in a dual economy, a major one specific to Palestine that explains the wage differentials was the implementation of the “Jewish labor-only” policy in the Jewish economy that sought to prevent Arab labor from competing with Jewish wage labor. This policy was adhered to

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid.