

Metzer's explanations coupled with the relative decline in the share of Arab agricultural employment may give the wrong impression that there were significant structural changes in the Arab economy. This is more apparent than real. A majority of Arab peasants who exited from agriculture, especially during WWII, were not absorbed in the other sectors of the Arab economy but in war-contingent government employment. Most of those peasants were either landless employed as wage laborers in varying degrees or in possession of small pieces of land that provided meager subsistence. Both of those groups were considered part of the agricultural labor force before the war. Statistically speaking, their exit during the war means a relative decline in the share of agricultural employment and what appears as a relative increase in the share of the other sectors.

In manufacturing, Metzer points out the disparities, not unexpectedly, between the two economies in terms of size of establishment, capital, horsepower, average number of workers per establishment, and output. The Jewish sector's share of value added in manufacturing increased from about half in the early 1920s to 80 percent by 1947 "thanks largely to the massive inflow of people and capital . . . and the war-induced industrialization phase."⁷⁸ Within the Jewish economy, that was also reflected in the substantial increase of manufacture's share in employment (doubled) and output (almost doubled).⁷⁹ However, although Metzer offers a credible explanation for this substantial growth in such a short

⁷⁸Ibid., 154.

⁷⁹Ibid., Table 5.2, 142.