

determined acquisitions.

Another element of the new strategy was the establishment of blocks of settlements to bolster isolated ones for security reasons. Finally, there was the political element as defined by the “national policy” that sought the establishment of a Jewish state. This element developed in the thirties when partition plans were being considered. In this regard, the strategy required buying land in areas that had no or little Jewish presence in order to preempt Jewish exclusion from these areas in partition plans. This included the acquisition of “reserve lands” even when funds were not available for immediate settlement.⁷⁹

The institutional framework that facilitated the European Jewish acquisition of land was provided by the imposition of the Mandate regime in Palestine. This role of the mandatory government was spelled out in Article 6 of the Mandate: “The Administration of Palestine . . . shall encourage in cooperation with a Jewish agency . . . close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands.”⁸⁰ This facilitating role was manifested by the different land transfer and registration ordinances enacted by the mandate government,⁸¹ in spite of the usually ineffective attempts at the “protection of cultivators” and the granting of concessions or long-term leases on substantial areas of land. Nonetheless, and in

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰“Mandate for Palestine,” Article 6, see *Survey I*, 5.

⁸¹For a fuller analysis of the British land policies, including ordinances, see Barbara J. Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920-1929* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 86-115.