

formations.

Thus, the growth of 'kulak-type' villages into capitalist estates is highly unlikely given the absence of a free market in land, while the dissolution of capitalist agriculture into the more optimal 'kulak' holdings is seen as the predominant trend especially as the national integration of the labour market is consolidated. Such a trend, we might add, is consonant with the persistence of peasant household production in areas of the third world and in Western Europe where large-scale capitalist farming has been proven inferior to peasant farming in terms of both efficiency and its ability to respond with the sufficient elasticity to recurrent crises resulting from price fluctuations (Harris, 1982:125).

Both state policies and the integration of the national economy into the world market (especially greater integration in the EEC), however, leave a number of questions about future trends unresolved. For instance, the impact of urban employment possibilities on the options of 'releasing' family labour or re-absorbing it within household production; access to credit facilities for agricultural expansion; the consequences of greater agricultural exports in curbing out-migration and creating pressures for land fragmentation, etc.

The analysis of transitional paths in Turkish agriculture also raises theoretical issues about the future of Middle Eastern rural society as a whole. In common with recent findings that emerged in several third world agrarian studies (e.g. Scott, 1976, for Southeast Asia; and Griffin, 1979, for South Asia and Latin America), the empirical evidence here does not support a unilinear (Leninist) or bipolar (dependentist) conception of agrarian development. Capitalist agriculture of the plantation type is seen as a transitional type. 'Landless peasants' which appear obtrusively in the statistical data contribute in a dis-