

torting fashion to unilinear concentration-proletarianization models (Djurfeldt, 1982:139-140). Quite often they (the 'landless peasants') are disguised members of the patriarchal household who work for the family farm, or who have migrated outside the village but maintain strong organic links with the farmstead. Proletarianization, Keydar argues, occurs much more significantly at the level of the national division of labour than in differentiations internal to agriculture.

That, indeed, is our finding from the analysis of the case studies obtained in the West Bank (Chapters 8, 9 and 10 below). There is, obviously, no exact correspondence between Keydar's prototypes of transitional forms in Turkey and equivalent patterns in the West Bank - but the direction of these patterns is strikingly similar. Type I formations, those characterized by marginalized petty commodity production, prevail in the central Palestinian highlands and engulf, as in Turkey, the vast majority of peasant households. They are exemplified in the discussions about Ras el-Tin and Natufa in this thesis. Type II formations, the 'kulak-type' villages, appear in embryonic forms in the irrigated farmsteads in the Jenin and Tulkarem districts of the West Bank, but their future is less stable than their Turkish equivalents, largely due to the precariousness of the internal market and land tenure conditions. Type III formations, the capitalist farms, also incipient, appear in the southern part of the Jordan Valley (Chapter 10, below) and in the citrus plantations in Gaza. In both cases, unlike Turkey, the refugee populations supply a seemingly unlimited pool of cheap wage-labour for this type.

The Palestinian case, however, also shows significant divergencies from the Turkish situation. In two main aspects these divergencies are striking: one is the emergence of the status of peasant-workers generated by the peculiar combination of geography (proximity of Israeli