

belonged to the realm of the 'thinkable' and 'do-able'--to borrow an imagery from M. Godelier). Specifically for the term 'deflection' to have any substantive meaning in this context, it is necessary to show that alternative bonds of class solidarity, among poor peasants, middle farmers, professionals, urban wage earners, etc., were a feasible proposal which could have ensured their prospects of livelihood in case they broke way from their factional loyalties.

I shall tackle this problem on two levels: First by referring to concrete examples--some of them already introduced above--indicating the challenge to factional politics provided by groups mobilized along non-factional lines; indeed, in some cases, along class lines. Second, by suggesting the limitations of class politics inherent in a situation, where the structural conditions for the growth of a hegemonic class, and in particular--a bourgeois class, were not obtainable.

Class politics in pre-1948 Palestine manifested itself in several small groups, and in trade union federations, but on occasions it appeared within the framework of the factional parties themselves. The Hussein/Nashashibi factions in particular could not have rested exclusively on relations of patronage since they had to mobilize masses of urban inhabitants at crucial intervals with whom they had no direct or indirect relations of reciprocity. In practice, therefore, the thousands of Palestinians who followed the lead of the Defense Party (Nashashibi), or the Arab Palestinian Party (Hussein) included many who by no means can be considered clients of either clan-based factions. They were attracted, for instance, by the solid stance taken by APP against the Jewish National Home and the mandatory authority--while, in the case of the DP they have been attracted by the 'moderation' of the Nashashibis and their strategy of alliance with the colonial authorities against the Zionist movement. Each position, of course, implied a different perspective of class alignment for