

resulted in fights among the workers, and the employers got all the help they needed for minimal wages. (Kana'ana, 1975:12)

Alternatively and despite their low incomes the cash earnings of poor peasant/labourers contributing to enhancing their status within the rapidly changing village hierarchy. But it was the middle peasants (more than 70% of the rural population according to Kana'ana) whose survival strategies guided the adaptation of Palestinians under Israeli rule. Forms of adaptation included: turning to cash crops in agriculture, introduction of 'Jewish' technology in their farms, and 'investing' their sons in higher education. Theirs was a strategy of "hostile competition" with Israeli society (Kana'ana, 1975:16).

Kana'ana regards the strengthening of the extended family as crucial to these adaptations, contrary to the observation of many Israeli writers--almost to the point of idealising the new function of the hamula (ibid:15).

Although enlightening in terms of describing the mechanism of post-1948 patterns of change in the Arab village, Kana'ana's analysis has certain pitfalls: he tends to overestimate the intensity of class conflict among Palestinian peasants in Israel. For example, in dismissing notions of inter-generational conflict and the presumed weakening of hamula power, he goes all the way in the opposite direction, suggesting a pattern of class conflict "between the old from one class, the previously upper and landowning class, and the young from the middle peasant class, with the former steadily losing out" (ibid). The problem here is that lines of demarcation between rich and middle peasants are nowhere clearly suggested (aside from the former being the descendents of "ancient good families", and "the rulers and manipulators of society"--ibid:8). Landlessness, on the other hand, seems to be the condition for the definition of poor peasantry, the two terms being used inter-