

Zureik, 1978). What this problem amounts to is how one interprets the nature of mediation in Israeli rule in the two Palestinian communities.

In the Galilee, where 80% of Israel's Palestinians are concentrated, this mediation is articulated through civil society; through the system, political parties, local councils, clan alliances and a personal nepotistic network of favouritism which permeates these agencies. The structural foundation of this mediation is the occupational integration of the Arab labour force in the Jewish economy. A considerable degree of coercion and intimidation is nevertheless used to supplement those institutions in order to guarantee the acquiescence of Palestinians to the Zionist society whose raison d'être excludes them (as Arabs) from its polity. But coercion as Lustick (1980) has convincingly argued has, since the abolition of the military government in 1961, been a secondary mechanism of political control. In the West Bank and Gaza, by contrast, mediation of Israeli rule has proceeded primarily through the machinery of the military government. The use of systematic physical coercion to maintain Israeli hegemony has been far in excess of what has been used among Israeli Arabs during the formative years of the Jewish State when the military government ruled supreme in the Galilee (1948-1961).¹ Despite the presence of similar structural trends of integration at the economic level between the two regions of Israeli control the difference cannot be attributed simply to the missing constitutional factor; i.e. the enfranchisement of Israeli Arabs, and its absence among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

I propose that the crucial explanation for this difference in colonial mediation lies in the divergent evolution of the two social structures we outlined above. While the West Bank has maintained its rural and urban hierarchies, albeit in a modified form, Galilean rural society had lost its original landed elites and intelligentsia and had, therefore, to fend on its