

cifically as influenced by Labor-Zionist practices.

According to Henry Rosenfeld, in 1920, the beginning of the British Mandate, 12 percent of the Arab villagers were wage earners.<sup>66</sup> The size of the Palestinian working class grew from 5,000 workers in 1925 to 11,000 in 1929, reaching 33,000 in 1935.<sup>67</sup> In the aftermath of the 1936 revolt of the Palestinian masses, the size of the Arab proletariat declined to 3,029, while the size of the Jewish proletariat reached 13,939.<sup>68</sup> This decline in the size of the Arab working class is often interpreted as the effect of repressive measures against this subversive labor action. Although this interpretation has much truth to it, one must see it also in response to the pace of Jewish immigration, to Aliyah. In 1935 alone, 61,000 Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine, fleeing Nazism.<sup>69</sup> These absolutely dispossessed Jewish immigrants who, owing to Nazi persecution, were made "free" laborers, possessing nothing but their labor power, were thus the most fit for proletarianization; and with their state of vulnerability, they were probably as competitive as cheap Arab labor.<sup>70</sup> Correlated with the pace of immigration was also the pace of land acquisition. In that same year, the Zionist movement acquired 70,000 donams of land; this probably implied further displacement of Palestinian peasants and, in effect, intensification of resistance that led into the 1936-1939 mass revolt in Palestine. The absorption of the new wave of Jewish immigrants urged better enforcement of the "conquest of land" and the "boycott of Arab labor". The latter is reflected also in the unemployment figures.

According to the Simpson Report, in 1930 unemployment in Palestine totalled 30,000 (Arabs and Jews) and wages declined by 50 percent. While the number of unemployed Arab workers was only 12,000, by 1935 it almost doubled, amounting to 23,000.<sup>71</sup> Notice the contradictory effect of the