

tal).

The bi-national proposal formulated by the extreme left proletarian Zionism was advocated probably as the only possible approximation to a wholly Jewish State in Palestine when the latter seemed impossible to accomplish, given the impossibility of optimizing the "Hebrew labor policy" under capitalist relations of production. By attempting to acquire the material prerequisites for establishing a Jewish national entity and State in Palestine (precisely through the conquest of Palestinian land and the boycott of Arab labor and produce), the Zionist movement had, in effect, distorted the material base of the Palestinian national existence; yet, had not fully acquired the demographic prerequisite for an only Jewish Sovereign State.

It was a most appropriate move (in terms of Zionist objectives), in light of those actual material conditions, to propose the bi-national solution, which rejects either a wholly Arab State or a wholly Jewish State in Palestine, advocating that "the sovereignty over the country should be held jointly and equally by two units constitutionally recognized as equal in weight and status, one representing the Jewish, the other representing the Arab, interests...."¹⁰⁵

From the point of view of the Zionist leadership, advocates of Jewish big capital, this proposal of course represents "the best of all evils"; it is the only thing that could have worked under those material conditions.

Right-wing proletarian Zionists seem, however, to have recalled Boro- chov's advice; "to create facts and more facts is the cornerstone of political strategy", hence, the expulsion of the Palestinian masses in 1948 and the creation of a new fact. This is the "transfer solution" that had ultimately made the proletarian Zionist strategy an effective one. Why the bi-