

the lack of opportunities."⁴⁹ The more foreign investment attracted, the lesser is emigration, the greater becomes the demand for more of this technically sophisticated lower-paid labor, and hence Labor and National Insurance, a monthly review of the Ministry of Labor, states in May, 1976: "The need for more academicians to be integrated into our industry is a national and economic goal we cannot overlook."⁵⁰ In light of such growing need, the question becomes, what are the potential sources of technical and scientific labor force to be mobilized in response to this growing need? Hypothetically, at least five alternatives exist: (a) intensive investment in human capital -- training of labor force already available in Israel; (b) mobilizing into the civilian labor force scientific Israeli labor force residing abroad or absorbed in the military; (c) intensifying selective immigration of professionally-trained Jews from technologically advanced countries; (d) import of non-Jewish European labor; and (e) heavier reliance on Arab labor.

However, not all these hypothetical sources are feasible in fact. If Israel were to pay the reproduction cost of her technically sophisticated labor power, she would not have the advantage of lower cost of production with favorable effects on realization. Thus, it would cease to provide one of its major investment incentives. Since it is the inflow of highly trained labor whose training cost falls outside the boundaries of her economy, that makes it economically feasible for Israel to provide foreign companies with lower-paid high-skilled labor. This is principally at the expense, not of this portion of the labor force (which is usually subsidized by philanthropic capital as an absorption cost), but mainly at the expense of the immigrants' countries of origin and also of the lower strata of the