

immigrants who are potential citizens in coping with labor shortage is neither economically nor politically viable; in the case of Israel, it can be a very risky deal, capable of promoting the vulnerability both of the State, as well as her very strategic high technology industry.

A remaining alternative to be explored in the face of an immigration crisis and in response to a growing demand for labor resulting from increasing foreign investment in the country is heavier reliance on Palestinian-Arab labor. Of course, Palestinian-Arab labor for clear security considerations cannot be integrated into Israeli high technology production. Perhaps it can replace, hence release, Jewish labor in less strategic economic branches. The availability of this reservoir of Palestinian labor (specifically from Gaza and the West Bank) is made possible by military occupation, and it can be maintained under control only by a growing army and police force, consisting mainly of Jews.

In his article "Israel 1976: A Bi-national State," Moshe Eter, Economic Editor of The Jerusalem Post attributes one of the problems of the economy and maldistribution of the labor force to the necessity to contain terrorists and to maintain security and political stability in the country and therefore, the police force increased by 120 percent and the civil employees by 40 percent. In addition to 19,000 in the police force, 150,000 are employed by special security agencies; this does not include the civil guards.⁵⁸

In part, this explains the constant decline in male Jewish participation in the civilian labor force. Palestinian-Arab labor is not likely to replace this Jewish labor force in such strategic apparatus of the